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Abstract
This is a writeup of lectures on “statistics” that have evolved from the 2009 Hadron
Collider Physics Summer School at CERN to the forthcoming 2018 school at Fermilab.
The emphasis is on foundations, using simple examples to illustrate the points that
are still debated in the professional statistics literature. The three main approaches
to interval estimation (Neyman confidence, Bayesian, likelihood ratio) are discussed
and compared in detail, with and without nuisance parameters. Hypothesis testing
is discussed mainly from the frequentist point of view, with pointers to the Bayesian
literature. Various foundational issues are emphasized, including the conditionality
principle and the likelihood principle.
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1 Introduction
This is a writeup of slides that I first prepared for two hours of lectures at the Hadron Collider
Physics Summer School (HCPSS) at CERN in 2009, and which eventually grew to about four
hours of lectures within the CMS collaboration in summer of 2017. I will prepare a shortened
version of the slides for lectures at the 2018 HCPSS at Fermilab. Unlike commonly available
lectures by many of my colleagues on practical statistics for data analysis, my lectures focus
on discussion of the foundational aspects, for which there is much less secondary literature
written by physicists.
I first got interested in the foundations of statistics in the late 1980’s, when I learned
that deep issues of great importance to science, such as “Is there a statistically significant
departure from expectations in my data?” were not at all settled. The issue is not merely,
“How many sigma is a discovery?”, but rather, “Is the (equivalent) number of sigma even
the right figure of merit for inferring the presence of a discovery?” The more I read about
the Bayesian–frequentist debates in the primary statistics literature (which has the wonder-
ful practice of including commentary and a rejoinder in many major papers), the more it
became a “hobby” to browse this literature and (thanks to the PhyStat series organized by
Louis Lyons and colleagues) to discuss these issues with preeminent statisticians and other
interested physicists.
The style here is rather terse, reflecting the origin in the slides [1], with each subsection
drawing attention to a point of interest or controversy, including pointers to more literature.
I do not assume much advanced statistics knowledge, but the reader will may well find the
subject to be surprisingly difficult. That is correct (!), and in fact is one of the main points
of my lectures. Of course, a familiarity with examples of plots from various HEP analyses
will be helpful.
By concentrating on the “theoretical” underpinnings, I hope to provide the reader with
what one must know in order to choose appropriate methods from the many possibilities.
This includes the hope that by studying these topics, one will learn to avoid common pitfalls
(and even silly statements) that can trip up professionals in the field.
This is a dense writeup, and I do not expect one to pick it all up in a quick read-through.
It should however be extremely useful to study the topics, referring to the references. I have
also tried to put in enough sub-headings so that one can use it as a reference on specific
topics. After some preliminaries, I begin with definitions and the Bayesian approach. That
should help to understand what the frequentist approach (described next) is not ! The
frequentist discussion includes interval estimation, hypothesis testing, conditional frequentist
estimation, and the much-debated issue of downward fluctuations in a search for an excess.
After discussing likelihood-ratio intervals, I compare the three approaches, including major
foundational issues such as the likelihood principle (Sections 9, 10). Finally I add nuisance
parameters in the context of each of the approaches. I conclude with a word about current
practice at the LHC.
The appendices have a detailed worked example of a hypothesis test for two simple
hypotheses; a brief discussion of the look-elsewhere effect; some further notes on Bayesian
model selection; and some remarks on point estimation. All of these are are important topics
that did not make it into my lectures.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Why foundations matter
In the “final analysis”, we often make approximations, take a pragmatic approach, or follow
a convention. To inform such actions, it is important to understand some foundational
aspects of statistical inference. In Quantum Mechanics, we are used to the fact that for
all of our practical work, one’s philosophical interpretation (e.g., of collapse of the wave
function) does not matter. In statistical inference, however, foundational differences result
in different answers : one cannot ignore them!
The professional statistics community went through the topics of many of our discussions
starting in the 1920’s, and revisited them in the resurgence of Bayesian methods in recent
decades. I attempt to summarize some of the things that we should understand from that
debate. Most importantly: One needs to understand both frequentist and Bayesian methods!
2.2 Definitions are important
As in physics, much confusion can be avoided by being precise about definitions, and much
confusion can be generated by being imprecise, or (especially) by assuming every-day defini-
tions in a technical context. By the end of these notes, you should see just as much confusion
in these statements:
1. “The confidence level tells you how much confidence one has that the true value is in
the confidence interval,”
2. “A noninformative prior probability density contains no information.”
. . . As you have learned to see in the statement, “I did a lot or work today by carrying this
big stone around the building and then putting it back in its original place.”
Confusion is also possible because the statistics literature uses some words differently
than does the HEP literature. A few examples are in Table 1, adapted from James [2].
Here I tend to use words from both columns, with nearly exclusive use of the statisticians’
definition of “estimation”, as discussed below.
Table 1: Potential for confusion
Physicists say. . . Statisticians say. . .
Determine, Measure Estimate
Estimate (Informed) Guess
Gaussian Normal
Breit-Wigner, Lorentzian Cauchy
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2.3 Key tasks: Important to distinguish
The most common tasks to be performed in statistical inference are typically classified as
follows.
• Point estimation: What single “measured” value of a parameter do you report? While
much is written about point estimation, in the end it is not clear what the criteria
are for a “best” estimator. Decision Theory can be used to specify criteria and choose
among point estimators. However, in HEP this is only implicitly done, and point
estimation is usually not a contentious issue: typically the maximum-likelihood (point)
estimator (MLE) serves our needs rather well, sometimes with a small correction for
bias if desired. (See Appendix D.) We generally put a “hat” (accent circumflex) over
a variable to denote a point estimate, e.g., µˆ.
• Interval estimation : What interval (giving a measure of uncertainty of the param-
eter inference) do you report? This is crucial in HEP (and in introductory physics
laboratory courses), and as discussed below, is deeply connected to frequentist hy-
pothesis testing. In HEP it is fairly mandatory that there is a confidence level that
gives the frequentist coverage probability (Section 6.11) of a method, even if it is a
Bayesian-inspired recipe.
Point estimation and interval estimation can be approached consistently by insisting
that the interval estimate contain the point estimate; in that case one can construct
the point estimate by taking the limit of interval estimates as intervals get smaller
(limit of confidence level going to zero).
For many problems in HEP, there is reasonable hope of approximate reconciliation
between Bayesian and frequentist methods for point and interval estimation, especially
with large sample sizes.
• Hypothesis testing: There are many special cases, including a test of:
(a) A given functional form (“model”) vs another functional form. Also known as
“model selection”;
(b) A single value of a parameter (say 0 or 1) vs all other values;
(c) Goodness of Fit: A given functional form against all other (unspecified) functional
forms (also known as “model checking”)
Bayesian methods for hypothesis testing generally attempt to calculate the probability
that a hypothesis is true. Frequentist methods cannot do this, and often lead to results
expressed as p-values (Section 7.6). There is a large literature bashing p-values, but
they are still deemed essential in HEP.
• Decision making: What action should I take (tell no one, issue press release, propose
new experiment, . . . ) based on the observed data? Decision making is rarely performed
formally in HEP, but it is important to understand the outline of the formal theory, in
order to avoid confusion with statistical inference that stops short of a decision, and
to inform informal application.
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In frequentist statistics, the above hypothesis testing case (b) maps identically onto
interval estimation. This is called the duality of “inversion of a hypothesis test to get
confidence intervals”, and vice versa. I discuss this in more detail in Section 7.4.
In contrast, in Bayesian statistics, hypothesis testing case (b) is an especially contro-
versial form of case (a), model selection. The model with fixed value of the parameter is
considered to be a lower-dimensional model in parameter space (one fewer parameter) than
the model with parameter not fixed. I just mention this here to foreshadow a very deep issue.
Because of the completely different structure of the approaches to testing, there be dramatic
differences between frequentist and Bayesian hypothesis testing methods, with conclusions
that apparently disagree, even in the limit of large data sets. Beware! See Appendix C and
my paper on the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox [3].
3 Probability
3.1 Definitions, Bayes’s theorem
Abstract mathematical probability P can be defined in terms of sets and axioms that P
obeys, as outlined in Ref. [4] (Chapter 1) and discussed in much more detail in Ref. [5]
(Chapter 5). Conditional probabilities P (B|A) (read “P of B given A”) and P (A|B) are
related by Bayes’s Theorem (or “Bayes’s Rule”):
P (B|A) = P (A|B)P (B)/P (A). (1)
A cartoon illustration of conditional probabilities and a “derivation” of Bayes’s theorem is
in Fig. 1.
Two established incarnations of P (still argued about, but to less practical effect) are:
• Frequentist P : the limiting frequency in an ensemble of imagined repeated samples (as
usually taught in Q.M.). P (constant of nature) and P (SUSY is true) do not exist (in
a useful way) for this definition of P (at least in one universe).
• (Subjective) Bayesian P : subjective (personalistic) degree of belief (as advocated by de
Finetti [6], Savage [7], and others). P (constant of nature) and P (SUSY is true) exist
for You. (In the literature, “You” is often capitalized to emphasize the personalistic
aspect.) This has been argued to be a basis for coherent personal decision-making
(where “coherent” has a technical meaning).
It is important to be able to work with either definition of P , and to know which one
you are using!
The descriptive word “Bayesian” applies to use of the above definition of probability
as degree of belief! The adjective “Bayesian” thus also normally applies to the use of a
probability density for any parameter (such as a constant of nature) whose true value is fixed
but unknown, even in a context where the practitioner is not really aware of the degree-of-
belief definition.
In contrast, Bayes’s theorem applies to any definition of probability that obeys the
axioms and for which the probabilities are defined in the relevant context! The distinction
8
Figure 1: A cartoon explanation of probability, conditional probability, and Bayes’s Theorem,
using picture arithmetic.
9
was noted by statistician Bradley Efron in his keynote talk at the 2003 PhyStat meeting at
SLAC [8]:
“Bayes’ rule is satisfying, convincing, and fun to use. But using Bayes’ rule does not make
one a Bayesian; always using it does, and that’s where difficulties begin.” (Emphasis
in original.)
Clearly Bayes’s theorem has more applications for Bayesian P than for frequentist P ,
since Bayesian P can be used in more contexts. But one of the sillier things one some-
times sees in HEP is the use of a frequentist example of Bayes’s Theorem as a foundational
argument for “Bayesian” statistics! Below I give a simple example for each definition of P .
3.2 Example of Bayes’s theorem using frequentist P
A b-tagging method is developed, and one measures:
P (b-tag|b-jet), i.e., efficiency for tagging b-jets
P (b-tag|not a b-jet), i.e., efficiency for background
P (no b-tag|b-jet) = 1− P (b-tag|b-jet)
P (no b-tag|not a b-jet) = 1− P (b-tag|not a b-jet).
Question: Given a selection of jets tagged as b-jets, what fraction of them is b-jets? I.e.,
what is P (b-jet|b-tag) ?
Answer: Cannot be determined from the given information!
One needs in addition: P (b-jet), the true fraction of all jets that are b-jets. Then Bayes’s
Theorem inverts the conditionality:
P (b-jet|b-tag) ∝ P (b-tag|b-jet)P (b-jet), (2)
(where I suppress the normalization denominator).
As noted, in HEP P (b-tag|b-jet) is called the efficiency for tagging b-jets. Meanwhile
P (b-jet|b-tag) is often called the purity of a sample of b-tagged jets. As this should be a
conceptually easy distinction for experienced data analysts in HEP, it is helpful to keep it
in mind when one encounters cases where it is perhaps tempting to make the logical error
of equating P (A|B) and P (B|A).
3.3 Example of Bayes’s theorem using Bayesian P
In a background-free experiment, a theorist uses a “model” to predict a signal with Poisson
mean of 3.0 events. From the Poisson formula (Eqn. 9) we know:
P (0 events|model true) = 3.00e−3.0/0! = 0.05
P (0 events|model false) = 1.0
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P (> 0 events|model true) = 0.95
P (> 0 events|model false) = 0.0.
The experiment is performed, and zero events are observed.
Question: Given the result of the experiment, what is the probability that the model is
true? I.e., What is P (model true|0 events)?
Answer: Cannot be determined from the given information!
One needs in addition: P (model true), the degree of belief in the model prior to the experi-
ment. Then Bayes’s Theorem inverts the conditionality:
P (model true|0 events) ∝ P (0 events|model true)P (model true) (3)
(again suppressing the normalization). It is instructive to apply Bayes’s Theorem in a little
more detail, with the normalization. In Eqn. 1, let “A” correspond to “0 events” and “B”
correspond to “model true”. Similarly, with P (not B) = 1 − P (B), we can write a version
of Bayes’s Theorem (replacing B with “not B”) as
P (not B|A) = P (A|not B)× P (not B)/P (A). (4)
(As a check, we can add Eqns. 1 and 4 and get unity, confirming that P (A) is the correct nor-
malization.) Solving Eqn. 4 for P (A) and substituting into Eqn. 1, and inserting numerical
values from above, yields P (B|A) = 0.05P (B)/(1− 0.95P (B)), i.e.,
P (model true|0 events) = 0.05× P (model true)
(1− 0.95P (model true)) . (5)
We can examine the limiting cases of strong prior belief in the model and very low prior
belief. If we let the “model” be the Standard Model, then we could express our high prior
belief as P (model true) = 1− , where  1. Plugging in gives, to lowest order,
P (model true|0 events) ≈ 1− 20. (6)
This is still very high degree of belief in the SM. Unfortunately, one still finds (in the press and
even among scientists) the fallacy that is analogous to people saying, “P (0 events|model true) =
5%, with 0 events observed, means there is 5% chance the SM is true.” (UGH!)
In contrast, let the “model” be large extra dimensions, so that for a skeptic, the prior
belief can be expressed as P (model true) = , for some other small . Then to lowest order
we have,
P (model true|0 events) ≈ 0.05. (7)
Low prior belief becomes even lower.
More realistic examples are of course more complex. But this example is good prepara-
tion for avoiding misinterpretation of p-values in Section 7.6.
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3.4 A note re Decisions
Suppose that as a result of the previous experiment, your degree of belief in the model is
P (model true|0 events) = 99%, and you need to decide on an action (making a press release,
or planning next experiment), based on the model being true.
Question: What should you decide?
Answer: Cannot be determined from the given information!
One needs in addition: The utility function (or its negative, the loss function), which quan-
tifies the relative costs (to You) of
Type I error: declaring model false when it is true; and of
Type II error: not declaring model false when it is false.
Thus, Your decision requires two subjective inputs: Your prior probabilities, and the relative
costs (or benefits) to You of outcomes.
Statisticians often focus on decision-making. In HEP, the tradition thus far is to com-
municate experimental results (well) short of formal decision calculations. It is important to
realize that frequentist (classical) “hypothesis testing” as discussed in Section 7 below (espe-
cially with conventions like 95% C.L. or 5σ) is not a complete theory of decision-making! One
must always keep this in mind, since the traditional “accept/reject” language of frequentist
hypothesis testing is too simplistic for “deciding”.
3.5 Aside: What is the “whole space”?
For probabilities to be well-defined, the “whole space” needs to be defined. This can be
difficult or impossible for both frequentists and Bayesians. For frequentists, specification
of the whole space may require listing the experimental protocol in detail, including the
experimenters’ reaction to potentially unexpected results that did not occur! For Bayesians,
normalization of probabilities of hypotheses requires enumerating all possible hypotheses and
assigning degree of belief to them, including hypotheses not yet formulated!
Thus, the “whole space” itself is more properly thought of as a conditional space, con-
ditional on the assumptions going into the model (Poisson process, whether or not total
number of events was fixed, etc.), and simplifying assumptions or approximations.
Furthermore, it is widely accepted that restricting the “whole space” to a relevant (“con-
ditional”) subspace can sometimes improve the quality of statistical inference. The important
topic of such “conditioning” in frequentist inference is discussed in detail in Section 11.1.
In general I do not clutter the notation with explicit mention of the assumptions defining
the “whole space”, but some prefer to do so. In any case, it is important to keep them in
mind, and to be aware of their effect on the results obtained.
4 Probability, probability density, likelihood
These are key building blocks in both frequentist and Bayesian statistics, and it is crucial
distinguish among them. In the following we let x be an observed quantity; sometimes we
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use n if the observation is integer-valued and we want to emphasize that (to aging Fortran
programmers). A “(statistical) model” is an equation specifying probabilities or probability
densities for observing x. We use µ for parameters (sometimes vector-valued) in the model.
In Bayesian statistics, the parameters themselves are considered to be “random vari-
ables”. The notation for such a general model is p(x|µ), where the vertical line (read “given”)
means conditional probability, conditional on a particular value of µ. (In the statistical lit-
erature, θ is more common.) In frequentist statistics, typically the dependence on µ is not a
proper conditional probability, and thus many experts advocate using notation with a semi-
colon: p(x;µ). The modern text by George Casella and Roger Berger [9] (p. 86) however
uses the vertical line for “given” in the context where the parameter is not a random variable
being conditioned on. I do not know of any examples where this causes trouble, so at the
risk of offending some, I use a vertical line throughout for both Bayesian and frequentist
models. Then the most common examples in HEP are:
• Binomial probability for non successes out of ntot trials (Section 6.5):
Bi(non|ntot, ρ) = ntot!
non!(ntot − non)! ρ
non (1− ρ)(ntot−non) (8)
• Poisson probability for n events to be observed:
P (n|µ) = µ
ne−µ
n!
(9)
• Gaussian probability density function (pdf):
p(x|µ, σ) = 1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 , (10)
so that p(x|µ, σ)dx is a differential of probability dP .
(A typical course in statistical physics shows how the latter two can be viewed as limiting
cases of the first.) The binomial and Poisson formulas are sometimes called probability mass
functions in the statistics literature.
In the Poisson case, suppose that n = 3 is observed. Substituting this observed value
n = 3 into P (n|µ) yields the likelihood function, L(µ) = µ3 exp(−µ)/3!, plotted in Fig. 2.
It is tempting to consider the area under L as meaningful, but L(µ) is not a probability
density in µ. The area under L (or parts of it) is meaningless! The Poisson example makes
this particularly clear, since the definition of L(µ) starts with a probability (not a probability
density); it makes no sense to multiply L(µ) by dµ and integrate.
As we shall see, likelihood ratios L(µ1)/L(µ2) are useful and frequently used.
4.1 Change of observable variable (“metric”) x in pdf p(x|µ)
For pdf p(x|µ) and a 1-to-1 change of variable (metric) from (vector) x to (vector) y(x), the
volume element is modified by the Jacobian. For a 1D function y(x), we have p(y)|dy| =
p(x)|dx|, so that
p(y(x)|µ) = p(x|µ) / |dy/dx|. (11)
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Figure 2: The likelihood function L(µ) after observing n = 3 in the Poisson model of Eqn. 9.
The likelihood obtains its maximum (ML) at µ = 3.
The Jacobian modifies the probability density in such a way to guarantee that
P (y(x1) < y < y(x2)) = P (x1 < x < x2), (12)
(or equivalent with decreasing y(x)). That is, the Jacobian guarantees that probabilities are
invariant under change of variable x.
Because of the Jacobian in Eqn. 11, the mode of probability density is in general not
invariant under change of metric. That is, the value of y for which p(y(x)) is a maximum is
not trivially related to the value of x for which p(x) is a maximum.
Another consequence of the Jacobian in Eqn. 11 is that the likelihood function L(µ) dif-
fers for different choices of the data variable. However, likelihood ratios such as L(µ1)/L(µ2)
are invariant under change of variable x to y(x). The Jacobian in the denominator cancels
that in the numerator. Thus, for example, the value of µ that maximizes L(µ) will be inde-
pendent of the choice of data variable, but the value of L(µ) at that maximum is different.
The latter point also explains why the value of L(µ) at its maximum is not an appropriate
test statistic for goodness of it; useful tests based on the likelihood function use likelihood
ratios [10].
4.2 Change of parameter µ in pdf p(x|µ)
The pdf for x given parameter µ = 3 is the same as the pdf for x given 1/µ = 1/3, or given
µ2 = 9, or given any specified function of µ. They all imply the same µ, and hence the same
pdf for x.
In slightly confusing notation, that is what we mean by changing the parameter from µ
to f(µ), and saying that
p(x|f(µ)) = p(x|µ). (13)
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Inserting an observed value of x, we see the important result that the likelihood L(µ)
is invariant (!) under reparameterization from parameter µ to f(µ): L(f(µ)) = L(µ). The
absence of a Jacobian reinforces the fact that L(µ) is not a pdf in µ. Furthermore, the mode
of L(µ) is thus also invariant: if we let µˆ be the value of µ for which L(µ) is a maximum,
and if we let fˆ be the value of f(µ) for which L(f) is a maximum, then
fˆ = f(µˆ). (14)
This is an important property of the popular ML technique of point estimation. (See dis-
cussion in Ref. [11], Section 5.3.1.)
4.3 Probability integral transform
In 1938 Egon Pearson commented on a paper of his father Karl (of χ2 fame), noting that
the probability integral transform “. . . seems likely to be one of the most fruitful conceptions
introduced into statistical theory in the last few years” [12]. Indeed this simple transform
makes many issues more clear (or trivial). Given continuous x ∈ (a, b), and its pdf p(x), one
transforms to y given by
y(x) =
∫ x
a
p(x′)dx′. (15)
Then trivially y ∈ (0, 1), and with the chain rule and the fundamental theorem of calculus,
it follows that the pdf for y is p(y) = 1 (uniform) for all y ! (If x is discrete, there are
complications.)
So for continuous variables, there always exists a metric y in which the pdf is uniform.
(As an aside, the inverse transformation can provide for efficient Monte Carlo (MC) genera-
tion of p(x) starting from a pseudo-random number generator uniform on (0,1). See Section
40.2 in Ref. [13].)
Looking ahead to Section 5, I mention here that the specification of a Bayesian prior
pdf p(µ) for parameter µ is thus equivalent to the choice of the metric g(µ) in which the pdf
is uniform. This is a deep issue, not always recognized by users of uniform prior pdf’s in
HEP!
4.4 Bayes’s theorem generalized to probability densities
Recall (Eqn. 1) that P (B|A) ∝ P (A|B)P (B). For Bayesian P , continuous parameters such
as µ are random variables with pdf’s.
Let pdf p(µ|x) be the conditional pdf for parameter µ, given data x. As usual p(x|µ)
is the conditional pdf for data x, given parameter µ. Then Bayes’s Theorem becomes
p(µ|x) ∝ p(x|µ)p(µ). Substituting in a particular set of observed data x0, we have p(µ|x0) ∝
p(x0|µ)p(µ).
Recognizing the likelihood (variously written as L(x0|µ), L(µ), or unfortunately even
L(µ|x0)), then
p(µ|x0) ∝ L(x0|µ)p(µ), (16)
where:
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p(µ|x0) = the posterior pdf for µ, given the results of this experiment,
L(x0|µ) = the likelihood function of µ from this experiment,
p(µ) = the prior pdf for µ, before applying the results of this experiment.
Note that there is one (and only one) probability density in µ on each side of the equation,
consistent with L(x0|µ) not being a density in µ!
(Aside: occasionally someone in HEP refers to the prior pdf as “a priori”. This is
incorrect, as is obvious when one considers that the posterior pdf from one experiment can
serve as the prior pdf for the next experiment.)
5 Bayesian analysis
All equations up until now are true for any definition of probability P that obeys the axioms,
including frequentist P , as long as the probabilities exist. For example, if µ is sampled from
an ensemble with known “prior” pdf, then it has a frequentist interpretation. (This is however
unusual.) The word “Bayesian” refers not to these equations, but to the choice of definition
of P as personal subjective degree of belief. For example, if µ is a constant of nature, its
Bayesian pdf expresses one’s relative belief in different values.
Bayesian P applies to hypotheses and constants of nature (while frequentist P does
not), so there are many Bayesian-only applications of Bayes’s Theorem. Bayesian analysis
is based on the Bayesian posterior pdf p(µ|x0), as sketched here.
• Point estimation: Some Bayesians use the posterior mode (maximum posterior density)
as the point estimate of µ. This has the problem that it is metric dependent: the point
estimate of the mean lifetime τ will not be the inverse of the point estimate of the
decay rate Γ. This is because the Jacobian moves the mode around under change of
parameter from lifetime τ to decay rate Γ = 1/τ . (Recall Section 4.1.) The posterior
median can be used in 1D, and is metric-independent. There are also Bayesians (as
well as frequentists) who think that emphasis on point estimation is misguided.
• Interval estimation: The credibility of µ being in any interval [µ1, µ2] can be calculated
by integrating p(µ|x0) over the interval. For reporting a default interval with, say, 68%
credibility, one needs in addition a convention for which 68% to use (lower, upper, or
central quantiles are common choices). It is preferable to refer to such intervals as
“credible intervals”, as opposed to “confidence intervals”, unless the Bayesian machin-
ery is used just as a technical device to obtain valid (at least approximate) frequentist
confidence intervals (as is often the case in HEP).
• Hypothesis testing: Unlike frequentist statistics, testing credibility of whether or not µ
equals a particular value µ0 is not performed by examining interval estimates (at least
assuming a regular posterior pdf). One starts over with Bayesian model selection,
as discussed in Appendix C. (Dirac δ-functions in the prior and posterior pdfs can
however connect interval estimation to model selection, with its issues.)
• Decision making: All decisions about µ require not only p(µ|x0) but also further input:
the utility function (or it negative, the loss function). See, e.g., Ref. [2] (Chapter 6)
and Ref. [14] (Chapter 2).
16
Since Bayesian analysis requires a prior pdf, big issues in Bayesian estimation include:
• What prior pdf to use, and how sensitive is the result to the prior?
• How to interpret posterior probability if the prior pdf is not Your personal subjective
belief?
Frequentist tools can be highly relevant to both questions!
5.1 Can “subjective” be taken out of “degree of belief”?
There are compelling arguments (Savage [7], De Finetti [6] and others) that Bayesian reason-
ing with personal subjective P is the uniquely “coherent” way (with technical definition of
coherent) of updating personal beliefs upon obtaining new data and making decisions based
on them. (These foundational works are very heavy going. For a more accessible review by
an outspoken subjectivist, with more complete references, see Lindley’s 2000 review [15]. A
2018 book by Diaconis and Skyrms [5] is also very detailed and at a deep level that seems
mostly comprehensible to physicists.)
A huge question is: Can the Bayesian formalism be used by scientists to report the
results of their experiments in an “objective” way (however one defines “objective”), and
does any of the glow of coherence remain when subjective P is replaced by something else?
An idea vigorously pursued by physicist Harold Jeffreys [16] in the mid-20th century is:
Can one define a prior p(µ) that contains as little information as possible?
The really really thoughtless idea (despite having a fancy name, “Laplace’s Principle of
Insufficient Reason”), recognized by Jeffreys as such, but dismayingly common in HEP is:
just choose prior p(µ) uniform in whatever metric you happen to be using!
5.2 “Uniform prior” requires a choice of metric
Recall that the probability integral transform always allows one to find a metric in which p is
uniform (for continuous µ). Thus the question, “What is the prior pdf p(µ)?” is equivalent
to the question, “For what function g(µ) is p(g) uniform?” There is usually no reason to
choose g arbitrarily as g(µ) = µ (!).
5.3 Jeffreys’s choice of metric in which prior is uniform
The modern foundation of the vast literature on prior pdfs that one may hope (in vain)
to be uninformative is the monograph by Harold Jeffreys [16]. He proposes more than one
approach, but the one that is commonly referred to as “Jeffreys Prior” (and considered the
default “noninformative” prior by statisticians for estimation in 1-parameter problems) is
derived from the statistical model p(x|µ).
This means that the prior pdf depends on the measurement apparatus! For example,
if the measurement apparatus has a resolution function that is Gaussian for mass m (with
σ independent of m), then the Jeffreys prior pdf p(m) for the mass is uniform in m. If a
different measurement apparatus has a resolution function that is Gaussian for m2, then the
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Jeffreys prior pdf p(m2) is uniform in m2. In the latter case, by the rules of probability
(Eqn. 11), the prior pdf p(m) is not uniform, but rather proportional to m (!).
Jeffreys’s derivation of his eponymous prior is based on the idea that the prior should
be uniform in a metric related to the Fisher information, calculated from curvature of the
log-likelihood function averaged over sample space. Some examples are:
Poisson signal mean µ, no background: p(µ) = 1/
√
µ
Poisson signal mean µ, mean background b: p(µ) = 1/
√
µ+ b
Mean µ of Gaussian with fixed σ (unbounded or bounded µ): p(µ) = 1
rms deviation σ of a Gaussian when mean fixed: p(σ) = 1/σ
Binomial parameter ρ, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 : p(ρ) = ρ−1/2(1− ρ)−1/2 = Beta(1/2, 1/2)
If parameter µ is changed to f(µ), the recipe for obtaining the Jeffreys prior for f(µ)
yields a different-looking prior that corresponds to the same choice of uniform metric. So
if you use Jeffreys’s recipe to obtain a prior pdf for µ, and your friend uses Jeffreys’s recipe
to obtain a prior pdf for f(µ), then those pdfs will be correctly related by the appropriate
Jacobian. (This is not true for some other rules, in particular if each of you takes a uniform
prior in the metric you are using.) Thus probabilities (integrals of pdfs over equivalent
endpoints) using Jeffreys prior are invariant under choices of different parameterizations.
For a detailed modern review of Jeffreys’s entire book, including his prior, with discus-
sion by six prominent statisticians (including outspoken subjectivist Lindley), and rejoinder,
see Ref. [17].
5.3.1 Reference priors of Bernardo and Berger
As Jeffreys noted, his recipe encounters difficulties with models having more than one pa-
rameter. Jose´ Bernardo [18] and J.O. Berger [19, 20] advocate an approach that they argue
works well in higher dimensions, with the crucial observation one must choose an ordering
of the parameters in order to well-define the multi-dimensional prior pdf. Their so-called
“Reference prior” reduces to the Jeffreys prior in 1D, with a different rationale, namely the
prior that leads to a posterior pdf that is most dominated by the likelihood.
There are many subtleties. Beware! See also Bernardo’s talk at PhyStat-2011, which
includes hypothesis testing, and discussion following [21]. Demortier, Jain, and Prosper
pioneered the use of Bernardo/Berger reference priors in a case of interest in HEP [22], with
about 30 citations thus far at inspirehep.net.
5.4 What to call such non-subjective priors?
• “Noninformative priors”? Traditional among statisticians, even though they know it is
a misnomer. (You should too!)
• “Vague priors”?
• “Ignorance priors”?
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• “Default priors”?
• “Reference priors”? (Unfortunately also refers to the specific recipe of Bernardo and
Berger)
• “Objective priors”? Despite the highly questionable use of the word, Jeffreys prior
and its generalization by Bernardo and Berger are now widely referred to as “objective
priors”.
Kass and Wasserman [23] give the best (neutral) name in my opinion: Priors selected
by “formal rules”. Their article is required reading for anyone using Bayesian methods!
Whatever the name, the prior pdf in one metric determines it in all other metrics: be
careful in the choice of metric in which it is uniform!
For one-parameter models, the “Jeffreys Prior” is the most common choice among statis-
ticians for a non-subjective “default” prior—so common that statisticians can be referring
to the Jeffreys prior when they say “flat prior” (e.g., D.R. Cox in discussion at PhyStat
2005 [24], p. 297).
A key point: priors such as the Jeffreys Prior are based on the likelihood function and
thus inherently derived from the measurement apparatus and procedure, not from thinking
about the parameter! This may seem strange, but does give advantages, particularly for
frequentist (!) coverage (Section 6.11), as mentioned in Section 12.7 and emphasized to us
by Jim Berger at the Confidence Limits Workshop at Fermilab in 2000 [25].
5.5 Whatever you call them, non-subjective priors cannot repre-
sent ignorance!
Although some authors have claimed that various invariance principles can be invoked to
yield priors that represent complete “ignorance”, I do not know of any modern statistician
who thinks that this is possible. On the contrary, (subjectivist) Dennis Lindley wrote, [26],
“the mistake is to think of them [Jeffreys priors or Bernardo/Berger’s reference priors] as
representing ignorance.” This Lindley quote is emphasized in the monograph by prominent
Bayesian Christian Robert [27] (p. 29).
Objectivist Jose Bernardo says, regarding his reference priors, “[With non-subjective
priors,] The contribution of the data in constructing the posterior of interest should be
‘dominant’. Note that this does not mean that a non-subjective prior is a mathematical
description of ‘ignorance’. Any prior reflects some form of knowledge.”
Nonetheless, Berger [14] (p. 90) argues that Bayesian analysis with noninformative priors
(older name for objective priors), such as those of Jeffreys and Bernardo/Berger, “is the single
most powerful method of statistical analysis, in the sense of being the ad hoc method most
likely to yield a sensible answer for a given investment of effort.” [emphasis in original].
5.6 Priors in high dimensions
Is there a sort of informational “phase space” that can lead us to a sort of probability Dalitz
plot? I.e., the desire is that structure in the posterior pdf represents information in the data,
not the effect of Jacobians in the priors. This is a notoriously hard problem!
19
Be careful: Uniform priors push the probability away from the origin to the boundary!
(The volume element goes as r2dr.) The state of the art for “objective” priors may be the
“reference priors” of Bernardo and Berger, but multi-D tools have been lacking. Subjective
priors are also very difficult to construct in high dimensions: human intuition is poor.
Subjective Bayesian Michael Goldstein [28] told us in 2002 at Durham, “. . . meaningful
prior specification of beliefs in probabilistic form over very large possibility spaces is very
difficult and may lead to a lot of arbitrariness in the specification . . . ”.
Bradley Efron at PhyStat-2003 [8] concluded: “Perhaps the most important general
lesson is that the facile use of what appear to be uninformative priors is a dangerous practice
in high dimensions.”
Sir David Cox [29], p. 46: “With multi-dimensional parameters. . . naive use of flat priors
can lead to procedures that are very poor from all perspectives. . . ”. Also p. 83: “. . . the
notion of a flat or indifferent prior in a many-dimensional problem is untenable.”
5.7 Types of Bayesians
The broad distinction between the subjective and objective Bayesians is far from the com-
plete story. At PhyStat-LHC in 2007, Sir David Cox described “Five faces of Bayesian
statistics” [30]:
• empirical Bayes: number of similar parameters with a frequency distribution
• neutral (reference) priors: Laplace, Jeffreys, Jaynes, Berger and Bernardo
• information-inserting priors (evidence-based)
• personalistic priors
• technical device for generating frequentist inference
Currently in HEP, the main application is the last “face” on his list: we typically desire good
frequentist properties for point or interval estimation when using a nominally “Bayesian”
recipe. In particular, for upper limits on a Poisson mean, we use a uniform prior (i.e.,
not what objective statisticians recommend), for frequentist reasons. (See Section 10 and
Ref. [31].) Cox’s third “face” also arises in HEP when likelihoods are incorporated from
subsidiary measurements, and are used to provide evidence-based priors. Unfortunately,
some people in HEP have in effect also added to Cox’s list a 6th “face”:
• Priors uniform in arbitrary variables, or in “the parameter of interest”.
I know of no justification for this in modern subjective or objective Bayesian theory. It is
an “ignorance” prior only in the sense that it betrays ignorance of the modern Bayesian
literature!
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5.8 Do “Bayesians” care about frequentist properties of their re-
sults?
Another claim that is dismaying to see among some physicists is the blanket statement
that “Bayesians do not care about frequentist properties”. While that may be true for
pure subjective Bayesians, most of the pragmatic Bayesians that we have met at PhyStat
meetings do use frequentist methods to help calibrate Bayesians statements. That seems to
be essential when using “objective” priors to obtain results that are used to communicate
inferences from experiments.
A variety of opinions on this topic are in the published comments in the inaugural
issue of the journal Bayesian Analysis, following the papers by Jim Berger [32] and Michael
Goldstein [33] that advocate the objective and subjective points of view, respectively. In
particular, Robert Kass [34] provided a list of nine questions for which answers “may be
used to classify various kinds of Bayesians”.
The first question is, “Is it important for Bayesian inferences to have good frequentist
operating characteristics?” The questions, the explicit answers from Kass, Berger, and
Goldstein, and other commentary (from which answers can be gleaned) from other prominent
statisticians, are part of my list of “required reading” for physicists. They should go a long
way toward broadening the view of any physicists who have swallowed some of the extreme
polemics about Bayesian analysis (as found for example in Jaynes [35], which unfortunately
seems to have been read uncritically by too many scientists).
5.9 Analysis of sensitivity to the prior
Since a Bayesian result depends on the prior probabilities, which are either personalistic or
with elements of arbitrariness, it is widely recommended by Bayesian statisticians to study
the sensitivity of the result to varying the prior.
• “Objective” Bayesian Jose´ Bernardo, quoted in Ref. [36]: “Non-subjective Bayesian
analysis is just a part—an important part, I believe —of a healthy sensitivity analysis
to the prior choice. . . ”.
• “Subjective” Bayesian Michael Goldstein, from the Proceedings [28]: “. . . Again, dif-
ferent individuals may react differently, and the sensitivity analysis for the effect of
the prior on the posterior is the analysis of the scientific community. . . ” In his trans-
parencies at the conference, he put it simply: “Sensitivity Analysis is at the heart of
scientific Bayesianism.”
I think that too little emphasis to this important point is given by Bayesian advocates in
HEP.
5.10 Bayesian must-read list for HEP/Astro/Cosmo (including
discussion!)
In my experience, some high energy physicists and astrophysicists appear to be overly influ-
enced by the polemical book by E.T. Jaynes [35], (which, for example, argues for the existence
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priors representing ignorance). I strongly urge anyone diving into Bayesian statistics to read
as well the following minimal set of papers by Bayesian subjectivists and objectivists, and
the associated discussion, and rejoinders. (If there is one thing that HEP journals could
learn from statisticians, it is to publish such discussion and rejoinder accompanying major
papers and reviews!) As I made this list over ten years ago, I would welcome suggestions for
more recent additions.
Robert E. Kass and Larry Wasserman, “The Selection of Prior Distributions by Formal
Rules,” [23]
Telba Z. Irony and Nozer D. Singpurwalla, “Non-informative priors do not exist: A dialogue
with Jose M. Bernardo,” [36]
James Berger, “The Case for Objective Bayesian Analysis,” [32]
Michael Goldstein, “Subjective Bayesian Analysis: Principles and Practice,” [33]
J.O. Berger and L.R. Pericchi, “Objective Bayesian Methods for Model Selection: Intro-
duction and Comparison,” [37]
5.11 Pseudo-Bayesian analyses
Jim Berger in 2006 [32]:
“One of the mysteries of modern Bayesianism is the lip service that is often paid to sub-
jective Bayesian analysis as opposed to objective Bayesian analysis, but then the practical
analysis actually uses a very adhoc version of objective Bayes, including use of constant pri-
ors, vague proper priors, choosing priors to ‘span’ the range of the likelihood, and choosing
priors with tuning parameters that are adjusted until the answer ‘looks nice.’ I call such anal-
yses pseudo-Bayes because, while they utilize Bayesian machinery, they do not carry with
them any of the guarantees of good performance that come with either true subjective analy-
sis (with a very extensive elicitation effort) or (well-studied) objective Bayesian analysis. . . I
do not mean to discourage this approach. It simply must be realized that pseudo-Bayes
techniques do not carry the guarantees of proper subjective or objective Bayesian analysis,
and hence must be validated by some other route.”
Berger goes on to give examples of pseudo-Bayes analyses, with the first being (what
else?), “Use of the constant prior density”.
Pseudo-Bayes analyses pop up from time to time in HEP, for example by those using
priors “uniform in the parameter of interest”. Here I mention three examples of “pseudo-
Bayes” in HEP that have been criticized by me and others. I previously discussed them at
the PhyStat-nu workshop in Tokyo in 2016 [38] (slides 62–68).
The first example was exposed in Luc Demortier’s talk in 2002 at Durham [39]. In a
method of Bayesian upper limit calculation that was common at the Tevatron at the time,
the use of a uniform prior for a Poisson mean, along with a Gaussian truncated at the origin
for a systematic uncertainty in efficiency, led to an integral that Luc showed “by hand”
to diverge! The integral was typically evaluated numerically, without first checking that it
exists. The answer thus depended on the choice of cutoff that was used in the numerical
evaluation. Alternatives to the truncated Gaussian prior are mentioned in Section 12.3.1.
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The second example comes from Joel Heinrich at the Oxford PhyStat in 2005 [40]. It
had been known a long time that a uniform prior for a Poisson mean of a signal yields good
frequentist properties for upper limits (but not lower limits). (See Section 10.) Joel showed
the dangers of naively using uniform prior for the means of several background processes.
The third example is in the category that I find has some of the worst pseudo-Bayes
examples, namely Bayesian model selection (Appendix C), which is however not attempted
as often as Bayesian estimation in HEP. Practitioners are sometimes unaware that:
1. In model selection, unlike estimation, the dependence on some prior pdfs for parameters
does not become negligible as the amount of data increases without bound (even for
so-called Bayes factors that attempt to separate out the prior probabilities of the
hypotheses).
2. Improper priors (such as uniform over a line or half-line) are a disaster, and if they are
made proper by adding a cutoff, then the model selection answer is directly proportional
to the (often arbitrary) cutoff. Using “1” for the prior just hides the problem.
3. In fact, Jeffreys and followers use priors for model selection that are different from
those used for estimation (!).
Thus, Bayesian model selection should not be approached naively. For an example in PRL
that I criticized, see my Comment in Ref. [41].
Harrison Prosper (an early and sustained advocate of Bayesian methods in HEP) has
provided an excellent discussion of the care needed in Bayesian analyses in Chapter 12 of
Data Analysis in High Energy Physics, edited by O. Behnke et al. [42].
6 Frequentist estimation: confidence intervals
What can be computed without using a prior, with only the frequentist definition of P?
• Not P (constant of nature is in some specific interval | data)
• Not P (SUSY is true | data)
• Not P (SM is false | data)
Rather:
1. Confidence Intervals for constants of nature or other parameter values, as defined in
the 1930’s by Jerzy Neyman. Statements are made about probabilities in ensembles of
intervals (fraction containing unknown true value). Confidence intervals have further
applications in frequentist hypothesis testing.
2. Likelihoods and thus likelihood ratios, the basis for a large set of techniques for point
estimation, interval estimation, and hypothesis testing.
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Both can be constructed using the frequentist definition of P . In this section, we introduce
confidence intervals, and in Section 8, introduce likelihood ratios for interval estimation.
“Confidence intervals”, and this phrase to describe them, were invented by Jerzy Ney-
man in 1934-37 [43]. Statisticians typically mean Neyman’s intervals (or an approximation
thereof) when they say “confidence interval”. In HEP the language is a little loose. I highly
recommend using “confidence interval” (and “confidence regions” when multi-D) only to de-
scribe intervals and regions corresponding to Neyman’s construction, described below, or by
recipes of other origin (including Bayesian recipes) only if they yield good approximations
thereof.
The following subsections use upper/lower limits and closely related central confidence
intervals to introduce and illustrate the basic notions, and then discuss Neyman’s more
general construction (used e.g. by Feldman and Cousins). Then, after introducing frequentist
hypothesis testing (Section 7), we return to make the connection between confidence intervals
and hypothesis testing of a particular value of parameter vs other values (Section 7.4).
6.1 Notation
x denotes observable(s). More generally, x is any convenient or useful function of the
observable(s), and is called a “statistic” or “test statistic”.
µ denotes parameter(s). (Statisticians often use θ.)
p(x|µ) is the probability or pdf (from context) characterizing everything that determines
the probabilities/densities of the observations, from laws of physics to experimental
setup and protocol. The function p(x|µ) is called “the statistical model”, or simply
“the model”, by statisticians.
6.2 The basic idea of confidence intervals in two sentences
Given the model p(x|µ) and the observed value x0, we ask: For what values of µ is x0 an
“extreme” value of x? Then we include in the confidence interval [µ1, µ2] those values of µ
for which x0 is not “extreme”.
(Note that this basic idea sticks strictly to the frequentist probability of obtaining x,
and makes no mention of probability (or density) for µ.)
6.2.1 Ordering principle is required for possible values of x
In order to define “extreme”, one needs to choose an ordering principle that ranks the possible
values of x applicable to each µ. By convention high rank means not extreme.
Some common ordering choices in 1D (when p(x|µ) is such that higher µ implies higher
average x) are:
• Order x from largest to smallest: the smallest values of x are the most extreme. Given
x0, the confidence interval that contains µ for which x0 is not extreme will typically
not contain the largest values of µ. This leads to confidence intervals known as upper
limits on µ.
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• Order x from smallest to largest. This leads to lower limits on µ.
• Order x using central quantiles of p(x|µ), with the quantiles shorter in x (least inte-
grated probability of x) containing higher-ranked x, with lower-ranked x added as the
central quantile gets longer (contains more integrated probability of x). This leads to
central confidence intervals for µ.
These three orderings apply only when x is 1D. A fourth ordering, using a particular
likelihood ratio advocated by Feldman and Cousins, is still to come (Section 6.7); it is
applicable in both 1D and multi-D.
6.2.2 A “confidence level” must be specified
Given model p(x|µ) and an ordering of x, one chooses a particular fraction of highest-ranked
values of x that are not considered as “extreme”. This fraction is called the confidence level
(C.L.), say 68% or 95%.
(In this discussion, 68% is more precisely 68.27%; 84% is 84.13%; etc. Also, in the statis-
tics literature there is a fine distinction between confidence level and confidence coefficient,
which we ignore here.)
We also define α = 1−C.L., i.e., the fraction that is the lower-ranked, “extreme” set of
values.
6.2.3 One-sentence summary
Then the confidence interval [µ1, µ2] contains those values of µ for which x0 is not “extreme”
at the chosen C.L., given the chosen ordering of x. E.g., at 68% C.L., [µ1, µ2] contains those
µ for which x0 is in the highest-ranked (least extreme) 68% values of x for each respective
µ, according probabilities obtained from the model p(x|µ).
6.3 Correspondence between upper/lower limits and central con-
fidence intervals
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the 84% C.L. upper limit µ2 excludes µ for which x0 is in the lowest
16% values of x. The 84% C.L. lower limit µ1 excludes µ for which x0 is in the highest 16%
values of x. Then, the interval [µ1, µ2] includes µ for which x0 is in the central 68% quantile
of x values. It is a 68% C.L. central confidence interval (!).
For general C.L., the endpoints of central confidence intervals are, by the same reasoning,
the same as upper/lower limits with confidence level given by 1−(1−C.L.)/2 = (1+C.L.)/2.
Examples follow for a couple illustrative models, first with continuous x, then with
discrete x.
6.4 Gaussian pdf p(x|µ, σ) with σ a function of µ: σ = 0.2µ
It is common in HEP to express uncertainties as a percentage of a mean µ (even though
situations in which this is rigorously motivated are rare). Thus, instead of the most trivial
25
Figure 3: Sketch to illustrate the relationship among 84% C.L. upper limits, 84% C.L. lower
limits, and 68% C.L. central confidence interval. The two one-sided tails of 16% compose
the two-sided tails totaling 32%.
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Figure 4: Plot of p(x|µ, σ), with µ = 10.0, σ = 0.2µ, as in Eqn. 17. In the subsequent
discussion, we suppose that the observed value is x0 = 10.0.
example of Gaussian with unknown mean µ and known rms σ, let’s assume that σ is 20% of
the unknown true value µ:
p(x|µ, σ) = 1√
2piσ2
e−(x−µ)
2/2σ2 = p(x|µ) = 1√
2pi(0.2µ)2
e−(x−µ)
2/2(0.2µ)2 , (17)
as illustrated in Fig. 4.
With µ (and hence σ) unknown, suppose x0 = 10.0 is observed. What can one say
about µ? Regardless of what else is done, it is always useful to plot the likelihood function,
in this case obtained by plugging x0 into Eqn. 17:
L(µ) = 1√
2pi(0.2µ)2
e−(10.0−µ)
2/2(0.2µ)2 , (18)
as illustrated in Fig. 5. The first thing one notices is that the likelihood is asymmetric and
obtains it maximum at µ less than the x0. (There is food for thought here, but we move on.)
6.4.1 What is the central confidence interval for µ?
First we find µ1 such that 84% of p(x|µ1, σ = 0.2µ1) is below x0 = 10.0; 16% of the probability
is above. Solve: µ1 = 8.33, as in Fig. 6(left). So [µ1,∞] is an 84% C.L. confidence interval,
and µ1 is 84% C.L. lower limit for µ.
Then we find µ2 such that 84% of p(x|µ2, σ = 0.2µ2) is above x0 = 10.0; 16% of the
probability is below. Solve: µ2 = 12.52, as in Fig. 6(right). So [−∞, µ2] is an 84% C.L.
confidence interval, and µ2 is 84% C.L. upper limit for µ.
Then the 68% C.L. central confidence interval is [µ1, µ2] = [8.33, 12.52]. This is “exact”.
In fact, the reasoning used here was already laid out by E.B. Wilson in 1927 [44] in his
discussion of intervals in the Gaussian approximation of the binomial model (Section 6.5.2).
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Figure 5: Plot of L(µ) for observed x0 = 10., for the model in Eqn. 17. The maximum is at
µML = 9.63
Figure 6: (left) The model in Eqn. 17, with µ chosen such that 84% of the probability is below
x0 = 10.0. (right) The model in Eqn. 17, with µ chosen such that 84% of the probability is
above x0 = 10.0.
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6.4.2 Contrast Wilson reasoning with “Wald interval” reasoning
The Wilson-inspired reasoning is crucial. Note the difference from the superficially attractive
reasoning that proceeds as follows, leading to so-called Wald intervals:
1. For x0 = 10.0, the “obvious” point estimate µˆ (perhaps thought to be justified by
minimum-χ2) is µˆ = 10.0. (This makes the mistake of interpreting the sampled value
of x as being the “measured value of µ”, and hence as the point estimate of µ, µˆ.)
2. Then one estimates σ by σˆ = 0.2 × µˆ = 2.0. (This is potentially dangerous, since it
estimates one parameter by plugging the point estimate of another parameter into a
relationship between true values of parameters.)
3. Then µˆ ± σˆ yields the interval [8.0, 12.0]. (Again this is potentially dangerous, as it
evaluates tail probabilities of a model having true parameters via plugging in estimates
of the parameters.)
Such “Wald intervals” are at best only approximations to exact intervals. For (“exact”)
confidence intervals, the reasoning must always involve probabilities for x calculated con-
sidering particular possible true values of parameters, as in the Wilson reasoning! Clearly
the validity of the approximate Wald-interval reasoning (i.e., how dangerous the “potentially
dangerous” steps are) depends on how much σ(µ) changes for µ relevant to problem at hand.
The important point is that the Wald reasoning is not the correct reasoning for confidence
intervals. Beware!
6.5 Confidence intervals for binomial parameter ρ
The binomial model is directly relevant to efficiency calculations in HEP, as well as other
contexts. Recall the binomial distribution Bi(non|ntot, ρ) from Eqn. 8 for the probability of
non successes in ntot trials, each with binomial parameter ρ. In repeated trials, non has mean
ntot ρ (19)
and rms deviation √
ntot ρ (1− ρ) . (20)
For asymptotically large ntot, Bi(non|ntot, ρ) can be approximated by a normal distribution
with this mean and rms deviation.
With observed number of successes non, the likelihood function L(ρ) follows from reading
Eqn. 8 as a function of ρ. The maximum is at
ρˆ = non/ntot. (21)
Suppose one observes non = 3 successes in ntot = 10 trials. The likelihood function L(ρ)
is plotted in Fig. 7.
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Figure 7: (left) Likelihood function L(ρ) for non = 3 successes in ntot = 10 trials in the
binomial model of Eqn. 8. (right) Looking ahead to Section 8, the plot of −2 lnL(ρ).
6.5.1 What central confidence interval should we report for ρ?
We have non = 3, ntot = 10. Let us find the “exact” 68% C.L. central confidence interval
[ρ1, ρ2]. Recall the shortcut in Section 6.4.1 for central intervals: Find the lower limit ρ1
with C.L. = (1 + 0.68)/2 = 84%; and find upper limit ρ2 with C.L. = 84%. Then [ρ1, ρ2] is
a 68% C.L. central confidence interval.
1. For lower limit at 84% C.L., find ρ1 such that Bi(non < 3|ρ1) = 84%, i.e., Bi(non ≥
3|ρ1) = 16%. Solve: ρ1 = 0.142 as in Fig. 8 (left).
2. For upper limit at 84% C.L.), find ρ2 such that Bi(non > 3|ρ2) = 84%, i.e., Bi(non ≤
3|ρ2) = 16%. Solve: ρ2 = 0.508 as in Fig. 8 (right).
3. Then [ρ1, ρ2] = [0.142, 0.508] is a central confidence interval with 68% C.L.
This is the same result as obtained by Clopper and Pearson (C-P) in 1934 [45], citing
Fisher, Neyman, and Neyman’s students. In HEP, such C-P intervals are the standard for a
binomial parameter; they have been in PDG RPP since 2002 [13] (although the connection
of the given formula with C-P is obscure).
The same method was applied to confidence intervals for a Poisson mean by Garwood
in his 1934 thesis, and published in 1936. (See Ref. [31], and references therein.) They are
also the standard in HEP when there is no background. There is controversy when there is
background; see PDG RPP (Section 39.4.2.4).
Many tables and online calculators for C-P intervals and Garwood intervals exist; I
usually use Ref [46].
The use of the word “exact” (dating to Fisher) for intervals such as C-P refers to the
construction above. But the discreteness of observed x (non in this case) causes the fre-
quentist coverage (defined and discussed Section 6.11 below) not to be exact, but rather
generally greater than the chosen C.L. C-P intervals are thus criticized by some as “waste-
fully conservative”. For a comprehensive review of both central and non-central confidence
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Figure 8: (left) Plot of Bi(non|ntot = 10, ρ), with ρ chosen such that 84% of the probability
is below non = 3. (right) Plot of Bi(non|ntot = 10, ρ), with ρ chosen such that 84% of the
probability is above non = 3.
intervals for a binomial parameter and for the ratio of Poisson means, see Cousins, Hymes,
and Tucker [47]. Many choices, including C-P, are implemented in ROOT [48].
For the closely related construction of upper/lower limits and central confidence intervals
for a Poisson mean, see Ref. [31].
6.5.2 Gaussian approximation for binomial confidence intervals: Wilson score
interval of 1927
As mentioned above, non has mean and rms deviation given by Eqns. 19 and 20, and for
asymptotically large ntot, Bi(non|ntot, ρ) converges to a Gaussian with mean µ(ρ) = ntotρ
and rms σ(ρ) =
√
ntotρ(1− ρ).
We can thus compute approximate confidence intervals for ρ while invoking this Gaussian
approximation to the binomial distribution.
The idea is not to substitute ρˆ for ρ in Eqns. 19 and 20 (potentially big mistake!), but
rather to follow the logic already used above from E.B. Wilson in 1927 [44]. (This is in fact
the example that he was illustrating in that paper!) That is, we use the above recipe for
upper and lower limits:
1. Find ρ1 such that Gauss(x ≥ 3|mean ρ1, σ(ρ1)) = 0.16.
2. Find ρ2 such that Gauss(x ≤ 3|mean ρ2, σ(ρ2)) = 0.16.
This consistently uses the (different) values of σ associated with each ρ, not σ(ρˆ). It
leads to a quadratic equation that, for our example, has solution [ρ1, ρ2] == [0.18, 0.46].
This is the approximate 68% C.L. confidence interval known as the Wilson score interval.
(See Ref. [47] and references therein.)
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Although this Wilson score interval needs only the quadratic formula, it is for some
reason relatively unknown, as students are taught the Wald interval (UGH) of the next
subsection.
6.5.3 Gaussian approximation for binomial confidence intervals: potentially dis-
astrous Wald interval to avoid
It is tempting instead to follow the so-called “Wald reasoning” mentioned in Section 6.4.2,
and to substitute ρˆ = ntotρ for ρ in the expression for the rms deviation in Eqn. 20. One
obtains: σˆ =
√
ntotρˆ(1− ρˆ) and it seems a simple step to the potentially disastrous “Wald
interval” ρˆ± σˆ, i.e., [ρ1, ρ2] = [ρˆ− σˆ, ρˆ+ σˆ].
The Wald interval does not use the correct logic for frequentist confidence! In fact,
σˆ = 0 when non = 0 or non = ntot.
Incredibly, the failure of the Wald interval when non = 0 (or non = ntot) has been
used as a foundational argument in favor of Bayesian intervals in at least four public HEP
postings (one retracted) and one published astrophysics paper! Of all the misguided things
that have been written about statistics (sometimes by me) in nominally scholarly writings,
this is among most uninformed that I have seen. (Typically the authors were not informed
about Bayesian statistics either, and thought that a prior uniform in ρ was obvious, without
having read the vast Bayesian literature on priors for a binomial parameter.)
Beware! Avoid the Wald interval except for “hallway estimates” — there is no reason
to use it. And certainly do not make the silly claim that problems with the Wald interval
point to foundational issues with confidence intervals. The Wald interval does not use
“confidence” reasoning, and was already obsolete in 1927 as the Gaussian approximation
to binomial confidence intervals; and by 1934 the exact intervals using confidence reasoning
were published by C-P! They have no problem with the cases “fatal” to Wald intervals,
non = 0 or non = ntot, as can be easily verified.
6.5.4 HEP applications of confidence intervals for binomial parameter
As mentioned, the binomial model is directly relevant to efficiency calculations in the usual
case where non is not fixed by the experiment design but rather sampled.
Using a famous math identity, the binomial model is also directly applicable to confi-
dence intervals for the ratio of Poisson means [47, 49]. Thus, it is applicable to statistical
significance (ZBi) of an excess in a signal bin when a sideband is used to estimate the mean
background. (See Cousins, Linnemann, and Tucker [50].) As discussed in our paper, one
can even stretch the use of ZBi (using a “rough correspondence”) to the problem of a signal
bin when a Gaussian estimate of mean background exists.
6.6 Perceived problems with upper/lower limits and hence for
central confidence intervals
For decades, issues with upper limits and central confidence intervals have been discussed in
two prototype problems in HEP:
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• Gaussian measurement resolution near a physical boundary (e.g., neutrino mass-squared
is positive, but the sample x is negative);
• Poisson signal mean measurement when observed number of events is less than mean
expected background (so that the naive “background-subtracted” mean is negative).
Many ideas have been put forward, and by 2002 the PDG RPP settled on three, which
remains the case [13]. I have described some of this interesting history in a “virtual talk” [51]
and in an arXiv post [52]. (See Section 14 in this paper.) In this section, I describe just one
of these three ideas, namely using Neyman’s confidence interval construction, going beyond
the common orderings of x discussed thus far (Section 6.2.1), to that advocated by Feldman
and Cousins (F-C) [53]. (The other two ideas in the RPP are Bayesian upper limits and
CLs (Section 14.1.)
6.7 Beyond upper/lower limits and central confidence intervals
Among the more general choices for ordering x in p(x|µ), the most common in HEP is that
based on a likelihood ratio (LR):
For each µ, order x0 using the likelihood ratio L(x0|µ)/L(x0|µbest-fit), where µbest-fit
respects the physical boundaries of µ. This was advocated in HEP by Feldman and Cousins
in 1998 [53]. In fact, as learned by F-C while their paper was in proof, the dual hypothesis test
(Section 7.4) appeared in the hypothesis test section of the frequentist classic by “Kendall
and Stuart” [54] long before and since. Unlike the orderings described above, the LR ordering
is applicable in both 1D and multi-D for x.
Recall from Section 4.1 that likelihood ratios as in F-C are independent of metric in x
since the Jacobians cancel, so there is no issue there. In contrast, an alternative that might
come to mind, namely ordering x by the probability density p(x|µ), is not recommended. A
change of metric from x to y(x) leads to a Jacobian |dy/dx| in p(y|µ) = p(x|µ)/|dy/dx| (as
in Section 4.1). So ordering by p(y|µ) is different than ordering by p(x|µ), and so all that
would follow from ordering by a pdf would depend on the arbitrary choice of metric.
In order to implement this more general ordering by likelihood ratios, we must go
beyond finding the confidence interval endpoints µ1 and µ2 independently, and perform the
construction of the whole interval at the same time, as in the next subsection.
6.8 Neyman’s Construction of Confidence Intervals
The general method for constructing “confidence intervals”, and the name, were invented
by Jerzy Neyman in 1934-37. It takes a bit of time to sink in—given how often confidence
intervals are misinterpreted, perhaps the argument is bit too ingenious! In particular, you
should understand that the confidence level does not tell you “how confident you are that
the unknown true value is in the specific interval you report”—only a subjective Bayesian
credible interval has that property! Rather, as stated in Section 6.2, the confidence interval
[µ1, µ2] contains those values of µ for which the observed x0 is not “extreme”, according to
the ordering principle chosen. In this section, we describe this construction in more detail
and more generality. We begin with 1D data and one parameter µ.
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Given a p(x|µ): For each value of µ, one draws a horizontal acceptance interval [x1, x2]
such that
p(x ∈ [x1, x2]|µ) = C.L. = 1− α, (22)
as in Fig. 9(left). The “ordering principle” that was chosen for x is used to well-define which
values of x are included.
Upon observing x and obtaining the value x0, one draws a vertical line through x0, as
in Fig. 9(right). The vertical confidence interval [µ1, µ2] with confidence level C.L. = 1− α
is the union of all values of µ for which the corresponding acceptance interval is intercepted
by the vertical line, as in Fig. 9(bottom). (It need not be simply connected, as in highly
nonlinear applications such as neutrino oscillations.)
Important note: x and µ need not have the same range, units, or (in generalization to
higher dimensions) dimensionality!
In fact, I think it is much easier to avoid confusion if x and µ are qualitatively different.
Louis Lyons gives the example where x is the flux of solar neutrinos and µ is the temperature
at the center of the sun. I like examples where x and µ have different dimensions: Neyman’s
original paper [43] has a 2D observation space and 1D parameter space; his figure was crucial
for my own understanding of the construction.
6.9 Famous confusion re Gaussian p(x|µ) where µ is mass ≥ 0
A prototype problem is the Gaussian model p(x|µ, σ) in Eqn. 10 in the case where µ cor-
responds to a quantity that is physically non-negative, e.g., a mass, a mass-squared, or an
interaction cross section. Note that in this case negative values of µ do not exist in the
model !
A particle’s mass-squared might be computed by measuring a particle’s energy-squared
(E2) with Gaussian resolution and also (independently) its momentum-squared (p2) with
Gaussian resolution. Then the observable x corresponding to mass-squared could be com-
puted from E2 − p2, with Gaussian resolution. If the true m2 is zero or small compared to
the resolution, then such a procedure can easily obtain a value of x that is negative. There
is nothing anomalous about negative x.
A key point that was a source of a lot of confusion historically in HEP, and which still
trips up people, is the following: It is crucial to distinguish between the observed data x,
which can be negative (no problem), and the model parameter µ, for which negative values
do not exist in the model. For parameter µ < 0, p(x|µ) does not exist: You would not know
how to simulate the physics of your detector response to negative mass!
The constraint µ ≥ 0 thus has nothing to do with a Bayesian prior pdf for µ (!!!) as
sometimes mistakenly thought. The constraint is in the model, and hence in the likelihood
L(µ), not in the prior pdf.
The confusion is encouraged since we often refer to x as the “measured value of µ”, and
say that x < 0 is “unphysical”. This is a bad habit! The value x is an observed sample from
a Gaussian centered on µ, with µ being “physical”.
Thus a proper Neyman construction graph for the case at hand has x with both arith-
metic signs but only non-negative µ ≥ 0. This is the case in the plot in Fig. 10(left), following
that in F-C [53]. There was a lot of confusion in the early days when the vertical axis on
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Figure 9: Steps in the Neyman construction, as described in the text. From Ref. [53].
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Figure 10: (left) The Neyman construction for the nonnegative mean of a Gaussian with
acceptance intervals shown in blue, as advocated in Ref. [53]. (right) The “confidence belt”
obtained from the construction on the left, showing the envelope of the acceptance intervals,
which are not drawn.
this plot was extended to non-physical values of µ. Since the model does not exist there, it
is a conceptual mistake to draw the acceptance intervals there (as some did).
For alternative methods for dealing with this situation, see Section 14.
6.10 Confidence belts
From the earliest days (as in the 1934 Clopper-Pearson paper [45]), the horizontal line
segments of the acceptance intervals (such as in Fig. 10(left)) have been suppressed, and only
their envelope, as in the black curves in Fig. 10(right), have been plotted. The black curves
(and interior) are called a confidence belt.
I added the line segments for demonstrating the construction in the F-C paper after
reading Neyman’s 1937 paper [43], in which his Fig. 1 has a couple planes with acceptance
regions shown, and a 1D vertical line at the observed 2D point intercepting them. This
practice in the F-C paper is fortunately spreading.
I had found other descriptions of the construction, showing only the belt, to be too
obscure when I was trying to learn the construction. There would be statements that I
found cryptic, such as “Notice that the confidence belt is constructed horizontally but read
vertically.” This made sense to me only after I had understood the construction!
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6.11 Confidence intervals and coverage
Do you recall how a vector is defined in an abstract math class? In math, one defines a vector
space as a set with certain properties, and then the definition of a vector is “an element of
a vector space”. A vector is not defined in isolation!
Similarly, whether constructed in practice by Neyman’s construction or some other
technique, a confidence interval is defined to be “an element of a confidence set”, where the
confidence set is a set of intervals defined to have the property of frequentist coverage under
repeated sampling:
Let µt be the unknown true value of µ. In repeated experiments, confidence intervals will
have different endpoints [µ1, µ2], since the endpoints are functions of the randomly sampled
x.
A little thought will convince you that a fraction C.L.= 1−α of intervals obtained from
Neyman’s construction will contain (“cover”) the fixed but unknown µt. I.e.,
P (µt ∈ [µ1, µ2]) = C.L. = 1− α. (23)
This equation is the definition of frequentist coverage. In this (frequentist!) equation, µt
is fixed and unknown. The endpoints µ1, µ2 are the random variables (!). Coverage is a
property of the set of confidence intervals, not of any one interval.
[Here is the “little thought” that explains why Neyman’s construction leads to coverage:
For the unknown true value µt, the probability that x0 is in its acceptance interval is C.L., by
construction. When those x0’s are obtained, the vertical line will intercept µt’s acceptance
region, and so µt be will be put into the confidence interval. Thus the coverage equation is
satisfied.]
One of the complaints about confidence intervals is that the consumer often forgets (if
he or she ever knew) that the random variables in Eqn. 23 are µ1 and µ2, and not µt; and
that coverage is a property of the set, not of an individual interval! Please don’t forget! A lot
of confusion might have been avoided if Neyman had chosen the names “coverage intervals”
and “coverage level ”! (Maybe we can have a summit meeting treaty where frequentists stop
saying “confidence” and Bayesians stop saying “noninformative”!)
Note: It is true (in precisely the sense defined by the ordering principle used for x in
the Neyman construction) that the confidence interval consists of those values of µ for which
the observed x0 is among the C.L. least extreme values to be observed.
6.11.1 Over-coverage when observable x is discrete
A problem arises in Neyman’s construction when the observable x (or more generally, the
test statistic) is discrete. This was already the case in the Clopper-Pearson paper. When
constructing an acceptance interval, typically Eqn. 22 cannot be satisfied exactly. The
traditional convention (still typically observed in HEP) is to include enough values of x so
that the equality becomes “≥”. This means that the coverage equation includes so-called
over-coverage:
P (µt ∈ [µ1, µ2]) ≥ C.L. = 1− α. (24)
For a discussion of this issue and various opinions about it, see Ref. [47] and references
therein.
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7 Frequentist (classical) hypothesis testing
At this point, we set aside confidence intervals for the moment and consider from the begin-
ning the nominally different topic of hypothesis testing. In fact, we will soon find that in
frequentists statistics, certain hypothesis tests will take us immediately back to confidence
intervals. But first we consider the more general framework.
Frequentist hypothesis testing, often called “classical” hypothesis testing, was developed
by J. Neyman and E. Pearson (N-P) in unfriendly competition with R.A. Fisher. Modern
testing has a mix of ideas from both “schools”. Following the N-P approach [2, 55], we frame
the discussion in terms of a null hypothesis H0 (e.g., the Standard Model), and an alternative
H1 (e.g., some Beyond-SM model).
As in Section 6.1, x is a test statistic (function of the observed data) and µ represents
parameters. Then the model p(x|µ) is different for H0 and H1, either because parameter µ
(often called θ by statisticians) has a different value, or because p(x|µ) itself is a different
functional form, perhaps with additional parameters.
For the null hypothesis H0, we order possible observations x from least extreme to most
extreme, using an ordering principle (which can depend on H1 as well). We choose a cutoff
α (smallish number).
We then “reject” H0 if the observed x0 is in the most extreme fraction α of observations
x (generated under H0). By construction:
α = probability (with x generated according to H0) of rejecting H0 when it is true, i.e., false
discovery claim (Type I error). It is called the size or significance level of the test.
To quantity the performance of this test if H1 is true, we further define:
β = probability (with x generated according to H1) of not rejecting (“accepting”) H0 when
it is false, i.e., not claiming a discovery when there is one (Type II error). The power
of the test is defined as 1− β.
Note: If the alternative H1 is not specified, then β is not known and optimality cannot
be well-defined. The test is then called a goodness-of-fit test of H0, as discussed in Section 7.7.
There is tradeoff between Type I and Type II errors. Competing analysis algorithms
(resulting in different test statistics) can be compared by looking at graphs of β vs α at
various µ, and at graphs of 1− β vs µ at various α (power function). (See, e.g., Ref. [2], pp.
258, 262.) This is similar to comparing b-tagging efficiency for signal and background. It is
equivalent to the ROC curve used on other fields.
Appendix A illustrates the tradeoff between α and β with a toy example of spin dis-
crimination of a new resonance.
7.1 The choice of Type I error probability α
The choice of operating point on the β vs α curve (or ROC curve) is a long discussion. (It
is even longer when considered as the number N of events increases, so that both α and
β are reduced.) The N-P language of “accept” or “reject” H0 should not be mistaken for
a complete theory of decision-making: A decision on whether or not to declare discovery
(falsifying H0) requires 2 more inputs:
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• Prior belief in H0 vs H1. (Can affect choice of α)
• Cost of Type I error (false discovery claim) vs cost of Type II error (missed discovery).
(Can also affect choice of α)
A one-size-fits-all criterion of α corresponding to 5σ is without foundation! For a discussion
of this point, see Refs. [3, 56].
Considerations such as these for the choice of α typically depend on the context. Using
the result of an experiment for a single test of a physics hypothesis is a very different context
than repeatedly selecting candidate b-jets with a b-tagging algorithm as in Section 3.2. In the
latter case, the tradeoff between β vs α is usually determined by considerations downstream
in the analysis.
7.2 Frequentist hypothesis testing: Simple hypotheses
In idealized cases that are sometimes reasonably well-approximated in HEP, a hypothesis
may have no floating (unfixed) parameters. N-P called such hypotheses simple, in contrast
to composite hypotheses that have unfixed parameters.
Examples in HEP where both H0 and H1 are truly simple are rare, but we do have a few
examples where the quantity of interest is simple in both hypotheses, and the role of unfixed
nuisance parameters does not badly spoil the “simplicity”. For example, the hypotheses H0
vs H1 might be:
• “jet originated from a quark” vs “jet originated from a gluon”, for a jet reconstructed
in the detector
• spin-1 vs spin-2 for a new resonance in µ+µ−
• JP = 0+ vs JP = 0− for the Higgs-like boson
A simplified, detailed illustration of the second test is in Appendix A, while an example of
the latter test published by CMS is in Section 7.6.2. Of course, framing these tests in this
way makes strong assumptions (in particular that one of the two hypotheses is true) that
need to be revisited once data are in hand.
7.2.1 Testing Simple hypotheses: Neyman–Pearson lemma
If the Type I error probability α is specified in a test of simple hypothesis H0 against simple
hypothesis H1, then the Type II error probability β is minimized by ordering x according to
the likelihood ratio [55],
λ = L(x|H0)/L(x|H1). (25)
One finds the cutoff λcut,α for the desired α and rejects H0 if λ ≤ λcut,α. For a conceptual
outline of a proof, see the lecture of Kyle Cranmer [57] as well as Ref. [54] (p. 176). As
mentioned, Appendix A has an example.
This “Neyman–Pearson lemma” applies only to a very special case: no fitted parameters,
not even undetermined parameters of interest! But it has inspired many generalizations, and
likelihood ratios are an oft-used component of both frequentist and Bayesian methods.
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7.3 Nested hypothesis testing
In contrast to two disjoint simple hypotheses, it is common in HEP for H0 to be nested in H1.
For example, commonly H0 corresponds to the parameter µ in H1 being equal to a particular
value µ0. (Typical values of µ0 are 0 or 1.) So we often consider:
H0: µ = µ0 (the “point null”, or “sharp hypothesis”) vs
H1: µ 6= µ0 (the “continuous alternative”).
Common examples are:
• Signal strength µ of new physics: null µ0 = 0, alternative µ > 0
• H0 → γγ before discovery of this decay, µ = signal strength: null µ0 = 0, alternative
µ > 0
• H0 → γγ after discovery of this decay: µ is the ratio of the signal strength to the SM
prediction; null µ0 = 1 (i.e., SM prediction), alternative is any other µ 6= µ0.
7.4 Nested hypothesis testing: Duality with intervals
In the classical frequentist formalism (but not the Bayesian formalism), the theory of these
tests maps to that of confidence intervals! The argument is as follows.
1. Having observed data x0, suppose the 90% C.L. confidence interval for µ is [µ1, µ2].
This contains all values of µ for which the observed x0 is ranked in the least extreme
90% of possible outcomes x according to p(x|µ) and the ordering principle in use.
2. With the same data x0, suppose that we wish to test H0 vs H1 (as defined in Section 7.3)
at Type I error probability α = 10%. We reject H0 if x0 is ranked in the most extreme
10% of x according to p(x|µ) and the ordering principle in use.
Comparing the two procedures, we see that we reject H0 at α = 10% if and only if µ0 is
outside the 90% C.L. confidence interval [µ1, µ2].
(In this verbal description, I am implicitly assuming that x is continuous and that p(x|µ)
is a pdf that puts zero probability on a point x with measure zero. Thus I ignore any issues
concerning endpoints of intervals.)
We conclude: Given an ordering: a test of H0 vs H1 at significance level α is equivalent
to asking: Is µ0 outside the confidence interval for µ with C.L. = 1− α?
As Kendall and Stuart put it, “There is thus no need to derive optimum properties
separately for tests and for intervals; there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
problems as in the dictionary in Table 20.1” [54] (p. 175). The table mentioned maps
the terminology that historically developed separately for intervals and for testing, e.g.,
α ↔ 1− C.L.
Most powerful ↔ Uniformly most accurate
Equal-tailed tests ↔ central confidence intervals
Use of this duality is referred to as “inverting a test” to obtain confidence intervals, and vice
versa.
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7.5 Feldman-Cousins
As mentioned in Section 6.7, the “new” likelihood-ratio (LR) ordering principle that Gary
Feldman and I advocated for confidence intervals in Ref. [53] turned out to be one and the
same as the time-honored ordering (generalized to include nuisance parameters) described in
Ref. [54] in the chapter of hypothesis testing using likelihood ratios. We had scoured statistics
literature for precedents of “our” intervals without finding anything. But we over-looked the
fact that we should also be scouring the literature on hypothesis tests, until Gary realized
that, just in time to get a note added in proof. In fact, it was all on 11
4
pages of “Kendall
and Stuart”, plus nuisance parameters! This led to rapid inclusion of the LR ordering in the
PDG RPP, since the proposal suddenly had the weight of real statistics literature behind it.
7.6 Post-data p-values and Z-values
The above N-P theory is all a pre-data characterization of the hypothesis test. A deep issue
is how to apply it after x0 is known, i.e., post-data.
In N-P theory, α is specified in advance. Suppose after obtaining data, you notice that
with α = 0.05 previously specified, you reject H0, but with α = 0.01 previously specified,
you accept H0. In fact, you determine that with the data set in hand, H0 would be rejected
for α ≥ 0.023.
This interesting value has a name: After data are obtained, the p-value is the smallest
value of α for which H0 would be rejected, had that value been specified in advance.
This is numerically (if not philosophically) the same as the definition used e.g. by Fisher
and often taught: “The p-value is the probability under H0 of obtaining x as extreme or more
extreme than the observed x0.” [4] (p. 58). See also Ref. [2] (p. 299) and Ref. [13] (Section
39.3.2).
In HEP, a p-value is typically converted to a Z-value (unfortunately commonly called
“the significance S”), which is the equivalent number of Gaussian standard deviations. E.g.,
for a one-tailed test in a search for an excess, p-value = 2.87× 10−7 corresponds to Z = 5.
Note that Gaussianity of the test statistic is typically not assumed when the p-value is
computed; this conversion to equivalent Gaussian “number of sigma” is just for perceived
ease of communication. This needs to be emphasized when communicating outside HEP, as
I hear too often statisticians wondering about Gaussian assumptions, in effect making the
conversion counter-productive (!).
Although these lectures are not “statistics in practice”, I mention ROOT commands for
one-tailed conversions (improved version courtesy of Igor Volobouev):
zvalue = -TMath::NormQuantile(pvalue)
pvalue = 0.5*TMath::Erfc(zvalue/sqrt(2.0))
In our usual one-tailed test convention, p-value > 0.5 corresponds to Z < 0.
7.6.1 Interpreting p-values and Z-values
In the example above, it is crucial to realize that that value of α equal to the p-value (0.023
in the example) was typically not specified in advance. So p-values do not correspond to
Type I error probabilities of experiments reporting them.
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The interpretation of p-values (and hence Z-values) is a long, contentious story—beware!
They are widely bashed; I discuss why in Section 9. I also defend their use in HEP. (See for
example my paper on the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox [3].)
Whatever they are, p-values are not the probability that H0 is true! This mis-interpretation
of p-values is unfortunately so common as to be used as an argument against frequentist
statistics. Please keep in mind:
• That p-values are calculated assuming that H0 is true, so they can hardly tell you the
probability that H0 is true!
• That the calculation of the “probability that H0 is true” requires prior(s) to invert the
conditional probabilities, as in Section 3.3.
Please help educate press officers and journalists! (and physicists)!
7.6.2 Early CMS Higgs boson spin-parity test of 0+ vs. 0−
As noted at the beginning of Section 7.2, the test of H0: J
P = 0+ vs H1: J
P = 0− for the
Higgs-like boson is a case where the parameter of interest (parity P) has two discrete values
of interest, and the role of the (many) unfixed nuisance parameters does not badly spoil
this “simplicity” in practice. Thus the test statistic used is (twice the negative log of) the
Neyman–Pearson likelihood ratio λ (with nuisance parameters separately optimized for each
P). An early result from CMS [58] is shown in Fig. 11. The pdf of the test statistic, obtained
by simulation, is shown for each hypothesis.
The similarity with the spin discrimination example in Appendix A is evident; the prin-
ciples are the same, but in the Higgs boson case the likelihood functions are more complicated
and there are nuisance parameters. As such examples are fairly rare in HEP (compared to
cases of a continuous alternative), there was a fair amount of discussion within CMS about
how best to present the results post-data. CMS reported:
1. The observed value λ = −2 ln(L0−/L0+) = 5.5, favoring 0+;
2. For a test of H0: 0
−, the p-value = 0.0072;
3. Reversing the role of the two hypotheses and testing H0: 0
+, the p-value = 0.7;
4. CLs = (0.0072)/(1− 0.7) = 0.024, “a more conservative value for judging whether the
observed data are compatible with 0−.” (See Section 14.1.)
Note that for each p-value calculation, the relevant tail probability is for the tail in the
direction of the other hypothesis. The Bayes factor (Section C) for this test is similar to the
observed value of λ reported, as it differs only in the treatment of the nuisance parameters
(marginalization rather than separate optimization).
Demortier and Lyons [59] discuss the two p-values in such a simple-vs-simple case,
contrasting tail probabilities with the likelihood ratio. See also Fig. 4 of Ref. [60].
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Figure 11: Figure and caption from the early CMS paper on a test of JP = 0+ vs JP = 0−
for the Higgs-like boson [58].
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7.6.3 Post-data choice of the C.L.
Section 7.4 describes how for a hypothesis test dual to intervals, the (pre-data) α corresponds
to 1−C.L. Then in Section 7.6, the (post-data) p-value is the smallest value of α for which
H0 : µ = µ0 would be rejected. In light of the duality, the corresponding post-data quantity
for intervals is “the largest value of the C.L. (or limiting value thereof) such that µ0 is not in
the confidence interval for µ.” This is clearly equal to one minus the p-value, but (remarkably
to me) it seems not to have a standard name in the statistics literature. Thus I will call it the
“critical C.L.” A more natural way to think about this critical value may be “the smallest
value of the C.L. such that µ0 is in the confidence interval for µ.”
For people focused more on the interval aspect of the duality, the critical C.L. may seem
a natural way to express a post-data result when a particular value µ0 is of interest. In fact,
shortly after the F-C paper, the CDF collaboration [61] measured a quantity called sin 2β
for which a key scientific question was whether sin 2β > 0. They reported the critical value
of C.L. (0.93) for which 0 was (just) included in the F-C interval (so that 0 was an endpoint
of the interval). I was in a couple email exchanges regarding what this 0.93 number was, and
how to interpret it (as people understood that it was not a pre-data coverage probability for
the CDF interval). Eventually we all agreed (I think) that it had exactly the same status
as a post-data p-value. Given the LR ordering used by F-C, a p-value associated with that
ordering for the test of sin 2β = 0 vs sin 2β > 0 was simply 1 - 0.93 = 0.07. Reporting the
critical C.L. was dual to reporting that critical α.
7.7 Classical frequentist goodness of fit (g.o.f.)
If H0 is specified but the alternative H1 is not, then only the Type I error probability α can
be calculated, since the Type II error probability β depends on a H1. A test with this feature
is called a test for goodness-of-fit (to H0). (Fisher called them significance tests. I leave it
to others, e.g., Ref. [62], to try to explain his seemingly pathological opposition to explicit
formulation of alternative hypotheses.) With no alternative specified, the question “Which
g.o.f. test is best?” is thus ill-posed. Despite the popularity of tests with universal maps
from test statistics to α (in particular χ2 and Kolmogorov tests), they may be ill-suited for
many problems (i.e., they may have poor power (1− β) against relevant alternative H1’s).
In 1D, the difficulty of the unbinned g.o.f. test question is exemplified by the following
simple example: “Given 3 numbers (e.g. neutrino mixing angles) in (0, 1), are they consistent
with three calls to a random number generator that is uniform on (0, 1) ?” Have fun with
that! For discussion of g.o.f., see my writeup [10] and references therein.
As multi-D unbinned ML fits have proliferated in recent decades, there are increasing
needs for multi-D unbinned g.o.f. tests. E.g., is it reasonable that 1000 events scattered in a
5D sample space have been drawn from a particular pdf (which may have parameters which
were fit using an unbinned M.L. fit to those 1000 events)? Of course this is an ill-posed
question, but we are looking for good omnibus tests. Then getting the null distribution of
the test statistic from toy MC simulation (Section 13) is typically doable, it seems. One can
follow an unbinned ML fit with a binned g.o.f. test such as χ2, but this brings in its own
issues. At a loss of power but increase in transparency, one can also perform tests on 1D or
2D distributions of the marginalized densities.
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For a enlightening study, see Aslan and Zech [63] (who propose an omnibus test called
the energy test) and others at past PhyStat workshops. 1D issues are well-described in the
book by D’Agostino and Stephens [64] (a must-read for those wanting to invent a new test).
A useful review is by Mike Williams [65].
8 Likelihood (ratio) intervals for 1 parameter
Recall from Part 1: the likelihood L(µ) is invariant under reparameterization from µ to f(µ):
L(µ) = L(f(µ)). So likelihood ratios L(µ1)/L(µ2) and log-likelihood differences lnL(µ1) −
lnL(µ2) are also invariant.
After using the maximum-likelihood method to obtain estimate µˆ that maximizes either
L(µ) or L(f(µ)), one can obtain a likelihood interval [µ1, µ2] as the union of all µ for which
2 lnL(µˆ)− 2 lnL(µ) ≤ Z2, (26)
for Z real.
As sample size increases (under important regularity conditions) this interval approaches
a central confidence interval with C.L. corresponding to ±Z Gaussian standard deviations.
Section 9.3.2 of Ref. [2] has a heuristic argument why this might work; more rigorous deriva-
tions are in the literature on “asymptotic” (large sample size) approximations. (See Chapter
6 in Ref. [29] and the discussions in Severini’s monograph devoted to likelihood methods [66].)
But! Regularity conditions, in particular the requirement that µˆ not be on the boundary
(which can also cause practical problems if it is close to a boundary), need to be carefully
checked. If µ ≥ 0 on physical grounds, then µˆ = 0 requires care. (See, e.g., Ref. [67] and
references therein.)
8.1 LR interval example: Gaussian pdf p(x|µ, σ) with σ = 0.2µ
Recall from Section 6.4 the Gaussian pdf with σ = 0.2µ. The likelihood function L(µ) for
observed x0 = 10.0 is plotted in Fig. 5, with a maximum at µML = 9.63. Fig. 12 is a plot
of −2 lnL(µ), from which the likelihood ratio interval for µ at approximate 68% C.L. is
[µ1, µ2] = [8.10, 11.9]. Compare with the exact confidence interval, [8.33,12.5].
8.2 Binomial likelihood-ratio interval example
Recall (Section 6.5) the example of non = 3 successes in ntot = 10 trials, with L(ρ) and
−2 lnL(ρ) plotted in Fig. 7. The minimum value of the latter is 2.64. Solving for solutions
to −2 lnL(ρ) = 2.64+1 = 3.64, one obtains the likelihood-ratio interval [ρ1, ρ2] = [0.17, 0.45].
This can be compared to the Clopper-Pearson interval, [ρ1, ρ2] = [0.14, 0.51], and the Wilson
interval, [ρ1, ρ2] = [0.18, 0.46].
8.3 Poisson likelihood-ratio interval example
Recall the plot of L(µ) in Fig. 2 for a Poisson process with n = 3 observed. Fig. 13 is a
plot of −2 lnL(µ), from which the likelihood ratio interval at approximate 68% C.L. can
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Figure 12: Plot of −2 lnL(µ) corresponding to Fig. 5, the case of Gaussian pdf p(x|µ, σ)
with σ = 0.2µ. Superimposed is the construction using Eqn. 26 with Z = 1 to find the
approximate 68% C.L. likelihood ratio interval.
be similarly extracted, yielding [µ1, µ2] = [1.58, 5.08]. The central confidence interval is
[µ1, µ2] = [1.37, 5.92].
9 Likelihood principle
Recall the three methods of interval construction for binomial parameter ρ upon observing
non = 3 out of ntot = 10 trials: Bayesian intervals as briefly outlined in Section 5, confidence
intervals in Section 6.5, and LR intervals in Section 8.2. We can note that:
• For constructing Bayesian and likelihood intervals, Bi(non|ntot, ρ) is evaluated only at
the observed value non = 3.
• For constructing confidence intervals we use, in addition, probabilities for values of non
not observed.
This distinction turns out to be a huge deal!
In both Bayesian methods and likelihood-ratio based methods, the probability (density)
for obtaining the data at hand is used (via the likelihood function), but probabilities for
obtaining other data are not used!
In contrast, in typical frequentist calculations (confidence intervals, p-values), one also
uses probabilities of data that could have been observed but that were not observed.
The assertion that only the former is valid is captured by the
• Likelihood Principle: If two experiments yield likelihood functions that are propor-
tional, then Your inferences from the two experiments should be identical.
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Figure 13: Plot of −2 lnL(µ) corresponding to Fig. 2, the case of Poisson probability in
Eqn. 9 with n = 3 observed. Superimposed is the construction using Eqn. 26 with Z = 1 to
find the approximate 68% C.L. likelihood ratio interval. See also Ref. [31]
There are various versions of the L.P., strong and weak forms, etc. See Ref. [54] and
the book by Berger and Wolpert [68].
The L.P. is built into Bayesian inference (except e.g., when Jeffreys prior leads to vi-
olation). The L.P. is violated by p-values and confidence intervals. Jeffreys [16] (p. 385)
still seems to be unsurpassed in his ironic criticism of tail probabilities, which include prob-
abilities of data more extreme than that observed: “What the use of [the p-value] implies,
therefore, is that a hypothesis that may be true may be rejected because it has not predicted
observable results that have not occurred.”
Although practical experience indicates that the L.P. may be too restrictive, it is useful
to keep in mind. When frequentist results “make no sense” or “are unphysical”, in my
experience the underlying reason can be traced to a bad violation of the L.P.
9.1 Likelihood principle example #1: the “Karmen problem”
You expect background events sampled from a Poisson distribution with mean b = 2.8,
assumed known precisely. For signal mean µ, the total number of events n is then sampled
from a Poisson distribution with mean µ+ b. So P (n) = (µ+ b)n exp(−µ− b)/n!.
Then suppose you observe no events at all! I.e., n = 0. (The numbers are taken from
an important neutrino experiment [69].) Plugging in,
L(µ) = (µ+ b)0 exp(−µ− b)/0! = exp(−µ) exp(−b) (27)
Note that changing b from 0 to 2.8 changes L(µ) only by the constant factor exp(−b). This
gets renormalized away in any Bayesian calculation, and is irrelevant for likelihood ratios.
So for zero events observed, likelihood-based inference about signal mean µ is independent
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of expected b when zero events are observed. (If the prior depends on b, as does the Jeffreys
prior for this example in Section 5.3, then there is potentially an issue. But I do not see this
used in HEP.)
For essentially all frequentist confidence interval constructions, the fact that n = 0 is
less likely for b = 2.8 than for b = 0 results in narrower confidence intervals for µ as b
increases. This is a clear violation of the L.P.
9.2 Likelihood principle example #2: binomial stopping rule
This is famous example among statisticians, translated to HEP. You want to measure the
efficiency  of some trigger selection. You count until reaching ntot = 100 zero-bias events,
and note that of these, m = 10 passed the selection. The probability for m is binomial with
binomial parameter :
Bi(m|ntot, ) = ntot!
m!(ntot −m)!
m(1− )(ntot−m) (28)
The point estimate is ˆ = 10/100, and we can compute the binomial confidence interval
(Clopper-Pearson) for . Also, plugging in the observed data, the likelihood function is
L() = 100!
10!90!
10(1− )90 (29)
Suppose that your colleague in a different experiment counts zero-bias events until m =
10 have passed her trigger selection. She notes that this required ntot = 100 minimum-bias
events (a coincidence). Intuitively, the fraction 10/100 over-estimates her trigger’s  because
she stopped just upon reaching 10 passed events. Indeed an unbiased estimate of  and
confidence interval will be slightly different from the binomial case.
The relevant distribution here is (a version of) the negative binomial:
NBi(ntot|m, ) = ntot − 1!
(m− 1)!
m(1− )(ntot−m) (30)
Plugging in the observed data, her likelihood function is
L() = 99!
9!90!
10(1− )90. (31)
So both you and your friend observed 10 successes out of 100 trials, but with different
stopping rules. Your likelihood function is based on the binomial distribution. Your friend’s is
based on the negative binomial distribution. The two likelihoods differ by (only!) a constant
factor, so the (strong) LP says that inferences should be identical. In contrast, frequentist
inferences that use probabilities of data not obtained result in different confidence intervals
and p-values for the different stopping rules.
Amusing sidebar: The Jeffreys prior is indeed different for the two distributions, so use
of Jeffreys prior violates (strong) L.P.
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9.3 Stopping rule principle
The two efficiency measurements have different stopping rules: one stops after ntot events,
and the other stops after m events pass the trigger. Frequentist confidence intervals depend
on the stopping rule; the likelihood function does not, except for an overall constant. So
Bayesians will get the same answer in both cases, unless the prior depends on the stopping
rule.
The strong L.P. implies, in this example, that the inference is independent of the stop-
ping rule! This irrelevance has been elevated to the “Stopping Rule Principle”. (It is
sometimes amusing to ask a recent Bayesian convert if they know that they just bought the
Stopping Rule Principle.) Concepts that average/sum over the sample space, such as bias
and tail probabilities, do not exist in the pure Bayesian framework.
A quote by L.J. (Jimmie) Savage (Ref. [70], p. 76), a prominent early subjective Bayesian
advocate, is widely mentioned (as seen in Google hits, which can point you to a copy of the
original “Savage forum” where you can read his original note):
“. . . I learned the stopping-rule principle from Professor Barnard, in conversation in the
summer of 1952. Frankly, I then thought it a scandal that anyone in the profession could
advance an idea so patently wrong, even as today I can scarcely believe that some people
resist an idea so patently right.”
9.4 Likelihood principle discussion
We will not resolve this issue, but we should be aware of it. There is a lot more to the
Likelihood Principle than I discuss here. See the book by Berger and Wolpert [68], but
be prepared for the Stopping Rule Principle to set your head spinning. When frequentist
confidence intervals from a Neyman construction badly violate the L.P., use great caution!
And when Bayesian inferences badly violate frequentist coverage, again use great caution!
In these lectures I omitted the important (frequentist) concept of a “sufficient statistic”,
due to Fisher. This is a way to describe data reduction without loss of relevant information.
E.g., for testing a binomial parameter, one needs only the total numbers of successes and
trials, and not the information on exactly which trials had successes. (See Ref. [54] for math
definitions.) The “Sufficiency Principle” says (paraphrasing—there are strong and weak
forms) that if the observed values of the sufficient statistic in two experiments are the same,
then they constitute equivalent evidence for use in inference.
Birnbaum famously argued (1962) that the Conditionality Principle (Section 11.3) and
the Sufficiency Principle imply the Likelihood Principle. Section 11.3 has a few more com-
ments on this point.
Controversy continues. For a recent discussion and references, see Deborah Mayo’s 2014
detailed article [71] and references therein, with comments by six statisticians and rejoinder.
10 Summary of three ways to make intervals
Table 2 summarizes properties of the three ways discussed to make intervals. Only frequentist
confidence intervals (Neyman’s construction or equivalent) can guarantee coverage. Only
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Table 2: Summary of three ways to make intervals. The asterisk reminds us that the choice
of prior might violate the likelihood principle.
Bayesian Frequentist Likelihood
credible confidence ratio
Requires prior pdf? Yes No No
Obeys Likelihood Principle? Yes* No Yes
Random variable(s) in P (µt ∈ [µ1, µ2]) = C.L. µt µ1, µ2 µ1, µ2
(Over)Coverage guaranteed? No Yes No
Provides P (parameter|data)? Yes No No
Table 3: 68 %C.L. confidence intervals for the mean of a Poisson distribution, based on the
single observation n = 3, calculated by various methods.
Method Prior Interval Length Coverage?
Wald, n±√n — (1.27, 4.73) 3.36 no
Garwood, Frequentist central — (1.37, 5.92) 4.55 yes
Bayesian central 1 (2.09, 5.92) 3.83 no
Bayesian central 1/µ (1.37, 4.64) 3.27 no
Bayesian central Jeffreys 1/
√
µ (1.72, 5.27) 3.55 no
Likelihood ratio — (1.58, 5.08) 3.50 no
Bayesian and likelihood intervals are guaranteed to satisfy the likelihood principle (except
when a prior such as Jeffreys’s prior violates it).
Table 3, inspired by Ref. [31], gives illustrative intervals for a specific Poisson case. It
is of great historical and practical importance in HEP that the right endpoint of Bayesian
central intervals with uniform prior is mathematically identical to that of the frequentist
central confidence interval (5.92 in the example of n = 3, but true for any n). By the
reasoning of Fig. 3, this identity applies to upper limits. In contrast, the prior 1/µ is needed
to obtain identity of the left endpoint of confidence intervals, and hence of lower limits (1.37
in the example, but true for any n).
The fact that our field is almost always concerned with upper (rather than lower) limits
on Poisson means is responsible for the nearly ubiquitous use of the uniform prior (instead
of the Jeffreys prior, for example); as noted in Section 5.7, the main use of the Bayesian
machinery in HEP is as a technical device for generating frequentist inference, i.e., intervals
that are (at least approximately) confidence intervals.
When known (fixed) background is added to the problem, the Bayesian intervals with
uniform prior for µ become conservative (over-cover), a feature that many are willing to
accept in order to obey the likelihood principle (or perhaps for less explicitly stated rea-
sons). (Even without background, frequentist intervals over-cover due to discreteness of n,
as discussed in Section 6.11.1.)
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11 1D parameter space, 2D observation space
Until now we have considered 1D parameter space and 1D observation space. Adding a
second observation adds surprising subtleties. As before, µ is a 1D parameter (often called
θ by statisticians). An experiment has two observations, the set {x1, x2}. These could be:
• two samples from the same p(x|µ), or
• one sample each of two different quantities sampled from a joint density p(x1, x2|µ).
For frequentist confidence intervals for µ, we proceed with a Neyman construction. Prior
to the experiment, for each µ, one uses an ordering principle on the sample space (x1, x2) to
select an acceptance region A(µ) in the sample space (x1, x2) such that P ((x1, x2) ∈ A(µ)) =
C.L. (As mentioned in Section 6.8, this was the illustration in Neyman’s original paper.)
Upon performing the experiment and observing the values {x1,0, x2,0}, the confidence
interval for µ at confidence level C.L. is the union of all values of µ for which the corresponding
acceptance region A(µ) includes the observed data {x1,0, x2,0}.
The problem is thus reduced to choosing an ordering of the points (x1, x2) in the sample
space, in order to well-define A(µ), given a C.L. This turns out to be surprisingly subtle,
exposing a further foundational issue.
11.1 Conditioning: Restricting the sample space used
by frequentists
We now return to the point mentioned in Section 3.5 regarding the “whole space” of possi-
bilities that is considered when computing probabilities.
In Neyman’s construction in the 2D sample space (x1, x2), the probabilities P ((x1, x2) ∈
A(µ)) associated with each acceptance region A(µ) are unconditional probabilities with
respect to the “whole” sample space of all possible values of (x1, x2). In contrast, Bayesian
inference is based on a single point in this sample space, the observed (x1,0, x2,0), per the
Likelihood Principle. There can be a middle ground in frequentist inference, in which the
probabilities P ((x1, x2) ∈ A(µ)) are conditional probabilities conditioned on a function of
(x1, x2), in effect restricting the sample space to a “recognizable subset” depending on the
observed data.
Restricting the sample space in this way is known as conditioning. Here I discuss two
famous examples:
• A somewhat artificial example of Welch [72] where the conditioning arises from the
mathematical structure;
• A more physical example of Cox [73] where the argument for conditioning seems “ob-
vious”.
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Figure 14: The rectangular pdf p(x|µ) of the Welch example, centered on µ.
11.1.1 Example of B.L. Welch (1939)
In this example, x1 and x2 are two samples from same p(x|µ), a rectangular pdf given by
(Fig. 14)
p(x|µ) =
{
1, if µ− 1
2
≤ x ≤ µ+ 1
2
0, otherwise.
(32)
The observed data is a set of two values {x1, x2} sampled from this pdf. From these data,
the point estimate for µ is the sample mean, µˆ = x¯ = (x1 + x2)/2. (Aside: if more than two
samples are observed, the point estimate is the mean of the outermost two, not the whole
sample mean; see Section D.0.1.)
What is a 68% C.L. central confidence interval for µ? To perform a Neyman construc-
tion, for each µ we must define an acceptance region A(µ) containing 68% of the unit square
(x1, x2) centered on µ, as in Fig. 15. Which 68% should one use? Centrality implies sym-
metry, but we need something else to rank points in the plane. The N-P Lemma suggests a
likelihood ratio, but first let’s think about some examples of possible pairs {x1, x2}.
A “lucky” sample with |x1−x2| close to 1 is shown in Fig. 16(left): L(µ) = L1(µ)×L2(µ)
is very narrow. Is it thus reasonable to expect small uncertainty in µˆ?
An “unlucky” sample with |x1 − x2| close to 0 is shown in Fig. 16(right): L(µ) has full
width close to 1, as the second observation adds almost no useful information. Should we
expect a 68% C.L. confidence interval for µ that is the same as for only one observation, i.e.
with length 0.68?
Intuition says that a reasonable answer might be a confidence interval centered on µˆ,
with a length that is 68% of the width of L, i.e., the interval µˆ± 0.34(1− |x1 − x2|).
From this argument, it seems reasonable for the post-data uncertainty to depend on
|x1 − x2|, which of course cannot be known in advance. This quantity |x1 − x2| is a classic
example of an ancillary statistic A: it has information on the uncertainty on the estimate
of µ, but no information on µ itself, because the distribution of A does not depend on
µ. An idea dating to Fisher and before is to divide the full “unconditional” sample space
into “recognizable subsets” (in this case having same or similar values of A), and calculate
probabilities using the “relevant” subset rather than the whole space!
The (representative) diagonal lines in Fig. 17(left) show a partition of the full sample
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Figure 15: The starting point for constructing confidence intervals in the Welch example: in
the 2D data space centered on (x1 = µ, x2 = µ) what should be the acceptance region A(µ)
containing 68% of the unit square? One should imagine a µ axis perpendicular to the plane
of the square, with such a square at each µ.
Figure 16: (left) A “lucky” set of observations {x1, x2} having small overlap of the likelihood
functions, so that possible true µ is localized. (right) an “unlucky” set of observations
{x1, x2}, for which the second observation adds little additional information.
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Figure 17: (left) Dividing the observation space into subsets based on the ancillary statistic
|x1 − x2|. (right), within each subset, acceptance regions containing the 68% central values
of |x1 + x2|.
space via the ancillary statistic A = |x1 − x2|. Within each partition, in Fig. 17(right), the
shading shows a central 68% probability acceptance region (red fill). We are thus using con-
ditional probabilities (still frequentist!) p(x|A, µ) in this Neyman construction, with desired
probability 68% within each partition. (Aside: A set of measure zero has zero probability
even if non-zero pdf, so in general, care is needed in conditioning on exact value of continuous
A in p(x|A, µ). This is not an issue here in this example.) The resulting A(µ) for the whole
square fills 68% of the square, so there is correct unconditional probability as well.
Imagine a plane such as this for every µ, and then obtaining the data {x1, x2}. The
confidence interval for µ is then the union of all values of µ for which the observed data are
in A(µ). A moment’s thought will confirm that this results in confidence intervals centered
on (x1 +x2)/2, with a length that is 68% of |x1−x2|, i.e., µˆ±0.34(1−|x1−x2|), as intuitively
thought reasonable!
This construction is known as “conditioning” on the ancillary statistic A. In fact, it
can be more simply stated: post-data, ignore the construction in the whole sample space
for values of A other than that observed, and proceed as if A had been fixed, rather than
randomly sampled!
Now the catch: one can find acceptance regions A(µ) that correspond to hypothesis
tests with more power (lower Type 2 error probability β) in the unconditional sample space!
A couple examples from the literature are shown in Fig. 18. The construction on the left
results in 68% C.L. intervals with length independent of |x1 − x2|, namely µˆ± 0.22 at 68%
C.L. They obtain 68% coverage in the unconditional sample space by having 100% coverage
in the subspace where |x1 − x2| ≈ 1 (narrow likelihood), while badly undercovering when
|x1 ≈ x2|.
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Figure 18: Alternative acceptance regions having more power than that in Fig. 17(right).
Welch’s 1939 paper argued against conditioning because it is less powerful in the uncon-
ditional sample space! Neyman’s position is not completely clear but he also seems to have
been against conditioning on ancillaries (which was Fisher’s idea) when it meant an overall
loss of power [62, 74].
Most modern writers use Welch’s example as an “obvious” argument in favor of condi-
tioning, unless one is in an “industrial” setting where the unconditional ensemble is sampled
repeatedly and the result for an individual sample is not of much interest.
11.1.2 Efron example that is structurally similar to Welch example
Brad Efron’s talk at PhyStat-2003 [8] included a similar example using the Cauchy distribu-
tion, where the ancillary statistic is the curvature of L(µ). He called the conditional answer
“correct”.
11.1.3 Cox two-measuring device example (1957)
For measuring a mean µ with Gaussian resolution, one of two devices is selected randomly
with equal probability:
Device #1 with σ1
Device #2 with σ2  σ1.
Then a single measurement sample is made with the chosen device.
In my notation, x1 is the index (1 or 2) chosen randomly and specifying the device,
and x2 is the single sample from the selected Gaussian measurement. The total observed
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data is then, as before, {x1, x2}. But in this example, x1 and x2 are samples of two different
quantities from the joint density p(x1, x2|µ).
In Ref. [42] (p. 112) Luc Demortier gives a nice example in HEP: µ is the mass of a
decaying particle with probability ph to decay hadronically (mass resolution σ1) and proba-
bility 1− ph to decay leptonically with mass resolution σ2). Thus the “measuring machine”
chosen randomly is the detector used to measure the decay mode that is randomly chosen
by quantum mechanics.
So µˆ = x2. What is the confidence interval? The index x1 is an ancillary statistic, and
it is reasonable (obvious?) to condition on it. I.e., we report a confidence interval giving
correct coverage in the subspace of measurements that used the same measuring device that
we used. So the 68% C.L. confidence interval is:
µˆ± σ1 if Device #1 was randomly selected
µˆ± σ2 if Device #2 was randomly selected
Again it turns out that more powerful tests can be found. Demortier gives details on
how the average length of intervals optimized in the unconditional sample space is shorter
in the HEP example. Here I give Cox’s discussion.
If one is testing µ = 0 vs µ = µ1, with µ1 roughly the size of σ1 (the larger σ), consider
the following intervals: µˆ ± (0.48)σ1 if Device #1 used (covers true µ in 37% of uses), and
µˆ± 5σ2 if Device #2 used (covers true µ nearly 100% of uses).
Then the true µ is covered in (37/2 + 100/2)% = 68% of all intervals! The unconditional
(full sample space) coverage is correct, but conditional coverage is not. Due to the smallness
of σ2, the average length of all intervals when averaging over the entire unconditional sample
space is smaller than for conditional intervals with independent coverage. One gives up power
with Device #1 and uses it in Device #2.
Cox asserts: “If, however, our object is to say ‘what can we learn from the data that we
have’, the unconditional test is surely no good.” [73] (p. 361) (See also Ref. [29] (pp. 47-48).)
11.2 Conditioning in HEP
A classic example is a measurement of the branching fraction of a particular decay mode
when the total number of decays N can fluctuate because the experimental design is to run
for a fixed length of time. Then N is an ancillary statistic. You perform an experiment and
obtain N total decays, and then do a toy MC simulation (Section 13) of repetitions of the
experiment. Do you let N fluctuate, or do you fix it to the value observed? It may seem
that the toy MC should include your complete procedure, including fluctuations in N .
But the above arguments would point toward conditioning on the value of the ancillary
statistic actually obtained. So your branching fraction measurement is binomial with trials
N . This was originally discussed in HEP by F. James and M. Roos [49]. For more complete
discussion, see Ref. [47].
11.3 Conditioning and the likelihood principle
To summarize: conditioning on an ancillary statistic A means: Even though A was randomly
sampled in the experimental procedure, after data are obtained, proceed as if A had been
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fixed to the value observed. Ignore the rest of the sample space with all those other values
of A that you could have obtained, but did not.
The Welch and Cox (and Efron) examples reveal a real conflict between N-P optimization
for power and conditioning to optimize relevance.
The assertion that inference should be conditioned on an ancillary in the Welch exam-
ple (where it comes out of the math) is often called the “Conditionality Principle” (CP).
Conditioning in the Cox example (a “mixture experiment” where the ancillary has physical
meaning about which experiment was performed) is then called the “Weak Conditionality
Principle” (WCP).
But note: in sufficiently complicated cases (for example if there is more than one an-
cillary statistic), the procedure is less clear. In many situations, ancillary statistics do not
exist, and it is not at all clear how to restrict the “whole space” to the relevant part for
frequentist coverage.
The pure Bayesian answer is to collapse the whole sample space to the data observed,
and refer only to the probability of the data observed, i.e., the likelihood principle discussed
in Section 9. This is literally the ultimate extreme in conditioning, conditioning (in the
continuous case) on a point of measure zero! (You can’t get any more “relevant”.) But the
price is giving up coverage.
When there are “recognizable subsets” with varying coverage, Buehler [75] has discussed
how a “conditional frequentist” can win bets against an “unconditional frequentist”. (See
Refs. [51, 52].)
I emphasize conditioning not only for the practical issues, but also to explain that there
are intermediate positions between the full unconditional frequentist philosophy and the
Likelihood Principle of Section 9. A key point is that unconditional frequentist coverage is
a pre-data assessment: the entire confidence belt is constructed independent of where the
observation lies. Thus a big argument is whether unconditional coverage remains appropriate
post-data, after one knows where one’s observed data lies in the sample space. When the
“measurement uncertainty” depends strongly on where one’s data lies, then the arguments
for conditioning seem strong. Whether or not one takes conditioning to the extreme and
considers only the (measure-zero) subset of the sample space corresponding to the data
observed is the issue of the Likelihood Principle [68].
It is not surprising that pure Bayesians argue for the importance of relevance of the in-
ference, and criticize frequentists for the danger of irrelevance (and the difficulty of diagnostic
of irrelevance). And it is not surprising that pure frequentists argue for the importance of
a useful measure of “error rates”, in the sense of Type 1 and Type 2 errors, coverage, etc.,
which may at best be estimates if the L.P. is observed.
12 2D parameter space, multi-D observation space
We (finally) generalize to two parameters µ1 and µ2, with both true values unknown. (I hope
that from context, there is no confusion from using the subscripts 1 and 2 to indicate different
parameters, whereas in the 1D case above, they indicate the endpoints of a confidence interval
on the single parameter µ.) Let data x be a multi-D vector, so the model is p(x|µ1, µ2). The
observed vector value is x0.
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Figure 19: Sketch of a 2D joint 68% C.L. likelihood region for (µ1, µ2), obtained via Eqn. 33.
First consider the desire to obtain a 2D confidence/credible region in the parameter
space (µ1, µ2). All three methods discussed for intervals handle this in a straightforward (in
principle) generalization. We mention the first two briefly and devote a subsection to the
third:
Bayesian: Put the observed data vector x0 into p(x|µ1, µ2) to obtain the likelihood func-
tion L(µ1, µ2). Multiply by the prior pdf p(µ1, µ2) to obtain the 2D posterior pdf p(µ1, µ2|x0).
Use the posterior pdf to obtain credible regions, etc., in (µ1, µ2).
Confidence intervals: Perform a Neyman construction: Find acceptance regionsA(µ1, µ2)
for x as a function of (µ1, µ2). The 2D confidence region is the union of all (µ1, µ2) for which
x0 is in A(µ1, µ2).
12.1 Likelihood regions in ≥ 2D parameter space
Recall the method for 1D confidence intervals, Eqn. 26. For a joint 2D likelihood region,
first find the global maximum of L(µ1, µ2), yielding point estimates µˆ1, µˆ2. Then find the
2D contour bounded by
2∆ lnL = 2 lnL(µˆ1, µˆ2)− 2 lnL(µ1, µ2) ≤ C, (33)
where C comes from Wilks’s Theorem, tabulated in the PDG RPP [13] (Table 39.2) for
various C.L. and for various values of m, the dimensionality of the confidence region. Here
we have the case m = 2, for which C = 2.3 for 68% C.L.
This region is an approximate confidence region, as sketched in Fig. 19. As in 1D,
Wilks’s Theorem is an asymptotic (large N) result, with various “regularity conditions” to
be satisfied. (Again see, e.g., Ref. [67] and references therein.)
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Figure 20: The dashed curve is the boundary of the 2D confidence region when both param-
eters are of interest. That shaded stripes are (left) 2D region to get 1D 68% C.L. interval
for µ1 (µ2 is nuisance). (right) 2D region to get 1D 68% C.L. interval for µ2 (µ1 is nuisance)
12.2 Nuisance parameters
Frequently one is interested in considering one parameter at a time, irrespective of the value
of other parameter(s). The parameter under consideration at the moment is called the
“parameter of interest” and the other parameters (at that moment) are called “nuisance
parameters”. E.g., if µ1 is of interest and µ2 is a nuisance parameter, then ideally one seeks
a 2D confidence region that is a vertical “stripe” in the (µ1, µ2) plane as in Fig. 20(left); this
allows the same 1D interval to be quoted for µ1, independent of µ2. Or, in different moment,
µ2 may be of interest and µ1 is a nuisance parameter; then one seeks a horizontal stripe, as
in Fig. 20(right). How can one construct those stripes?
Each of the three main classes of constructing intervals (Bayesian, Neyman confidence,
likelihood ratio) has a “native” way to incorporate the uncertainty on the nuisance parame-
ters, described in Sections 12.3–12.5. But this remains a topic of frontier statistics research.
12.2.1 Systematic uncertainties as nuisance parameters
Systematic uncertainties provide prototype examples of parameters that are frequently nui-
sance parameters, so I mention them briefly here. A typical measurement in HEP has many
subsidiary measurements of quantities not of direct physics interest, but which enter into the
calculation of the physics quantity of particular interest. E.g., if an absolute cross section is
measured, one will have uncertainty in the integrated luminosity L, in the background level
b, the efficiency e of detecting the signal, etc. In HEP, we call these systematic uncertainties,
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but statisticians (for the obvious reason) refer to L, b, and e as nuisance parameters. For
discussion of many of the issues with systematic uncertainties in HEP, see Refs. [76, 77, 78].
However, it is important to keep in mind is that whether or not a parameter is considered
to be a nuisance parameter depends on context. For example, in measurements of Higgs
boson couplings, the mass of the Higgs boson is typically regarded as a nuisance parameter.
But clearly the mass of the Higgs boson can itself be the primary object of a measurement,
in which case the couplings are the nuisance parameters.
12.3 Nuisance parameters I: Bayesian credible intervals
Construct a multi-D prior pdf p(parameters) for the space spanned by all parameters. Mul-
tiply by the likelihood function L(data|parameters) for the data obtained to obtained the
multi-D posterior pdf. Integrate over the full subspace of all nuisance parameters (marginal-
ization). Thus obtain the 1D posterior pdf for the parameter of interest. Further use of the
posterior pdf is thus reduced to the case of no nuisance parameters.
Problems: The multi-D prior pdf is a problem for both subjective and non-subjective
priors. In HEP there has been little use of the favored non-subjective priors (reference priors
of Bernardo and Berger). The high-D integral can be a technical problem, more and more
overcome by Markov Chain Monte Carlo.
As with all Bayesian analyses, how does one interpret probability if “default” priors are
used, so that coherent subjective probability is not applicable?
12.3.1 Priors for nuisance parameters
It used to be (unfortunately) common practice to express, say, a 50% systematic uncertainty
on a positive quantity as a Gaussian with 50% rms. Then one “truncated” the Gaussian by
not using non-positive values.
As mentioned in Section 5.11 but worth repeating, in Bayesian calculations, the inter-
action of a uniform prior for a Poisson mean and a “truncated Gaussian” for systematic
uncertainty in efficiency leads to an integral that diverges if the truncation is at origin [39].
In evaluating the integral numerically, some people did not even notice!
Recommendation: Use lognormal or (certain) Gamma distributions instead of truncated
Gaussian. Recipes are in my note [79].
12.4 Nuisance parameters II: Neyman construction
For each point in the subspace of nuisance parameters, treat them as fixed true values
and perform a Neyman construction for multi-D confidence regions in the full space of all
parameters. Project these regions onto the subspace of the parameter of interest.
Problems: Typically intractable and causes overcoverage, and therefore rarely attempted.
Tractability can sometimes be recovered by doing the construction in the lower dimen-
sional space of the profile likelihood function, obtaining approximate coverage. (This is one
way to interpret the Kendall and Stuart pages on the likelihood ratio test with nuisance
parameters [54].)
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Figure 21: Sketches for likelihood ratio regions. (left) The 2D confidence region from Fig. 19,
when both parameters are of interest. (right) On the same scale, the 2D confidence region if
µ1 is of interest and µ2 is a nuisance parameter, so that effectively one obtains a confidence
interval for µ1 that is independent of µ2. The width of the stripe is smaller than the width
of the extrema of the region on the left, since a smaller value of C is used in Eqn. 33: the
dashed contour on the right is inside the solid contour on the left. Both the left and the right
shaded regions correspond to the same C.L.; the left region is relevant for joint inference on
the pair of parameters, while the right region is relevant when only µ1 is of interest.
Problem: Not well-studied. Typically “elimination” is done in a way technically feasible,
and the coverage studied with toy MC simulation (Section 13).
12.5 Nuisance parameters III: Likelihood ratio intervals
Many of us raised on MINUIT MINOS read the article by F. James, “Interpretation of the
Shape of the Likelihood Function around Its Minimum,” [80]. Whereas the 2D region in
Section 12.1 has m = 2 and hence 2∆ lnL ≤ 2.3, for 1D intervals on µ1, we first a make
2D contour with the m = 1 value, 2∆ lnL = 1, as shown by the black dashed curve in
Fig. 21(right). Then the extrema in µ1 of this curve correspond to the endpoints of the
approximate confidence interval for µ1.
12.5.1 Profile likelihood function
At the Fermilab Confidence Limits Workshop in 2000, statistician Wolfgang Rolke expressed
the construction in a different (but exactly equivalent) way [81, 82], as illustrated in Fig. 22
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Figure 22: Red curve is path (µ1, ˆˆµ2) along which profile L is evaluated
and paraphrased as follows:
• For each µ1, find the value ˆˆµ2 that minimizes −2 lnL(µ1, ˆˆµ2). Make a 1D plot vs µ1 of
(twice the negative log of) this “profile likelihood function” −2 lnLprofile(µ1). Use the
m = 1 threshold on −2 lnLprofile(µ1), i.e., Eqn. 26, to obtain intervals at the desired
C.L.
The interval one obtains in Fig. 22 is the exact same interval as obtained by “MINOS”
in Fig. 21(right). Can you see why? Since 2000, the “profile” statistical terminology has per-
meated HEP. The “hat-hat” notation (stacked circumflex accents) is also used by “Kendall
and Stuart” [54] in the generalized hypothesis test that is dual to the intervals of Feldman
and Cousins. See also Ref. [67].
Warning: Combining profile likelihoods from two experiments is unreliable. Apply
profiling after combining the full likelihoods [83].
Problems with profile likelihood:
Coverage is not guaranteed, particularly with small sample size. By using the best-fit
value of the nuisance parameters corresponding to each value of the parameter of interest,
this has an (undeserved?) reputation for underestimating the true uncertainties.
In Poisson problems, the profile likelihood (MINUIT MINOS) gives surprisingly good
performance in many problems. See Rolke, et al. [82].
In some cases (for example when there are spikes in L), marginalization may give better
frequentist performance, I have heard. For small sample sizes, there is no theorem to tell
us whether profiling or marginalization of nuisance parameters will give better frequentist
coverage for the parameter of interest.
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12.6 Not eliminating a nuisance parameter: the “raster scan”
In the 2D example of Figure 21, the right side is an attempt to “eliminate” the nuisance
parameter µ2 by obtaining an interval estimate for µ1 that is independent of µ2. However,
it may be that it is preferable simply to quote a 1D interval estimate for µ1 as a function of
assumed true values for µ2. In a toy neutrino oscillation example, Feldman and Cousins [53]
contrasted their unified approach with this method, which they referred to as a “raster scan”,
in analogy with the way old televisions drew lines across the screen.
As an example, I am reminded that before the top quark mass was known, other mea-
surements (and theoretical predictions) were typically given as a function of the unknown
top quark mass, with no attempt to “eliminate” it (for example by putting a Bayesian prior
pdf on it and integrating it out). In the search for the Higgs boson and ultimately the
discovery, its unknown mass was a nuisance parameter that was also treated by raster scan:
all the plots of upper limits on cross section, as well as p-values testing the background-only
hypothesis, are given as a function of mass.
When to use a raster scan is a matter of judgment; for some useful considerations and
detailed explanations, see Ref. [84].
12.7 Hybrid techniques: Introduction to pragmatism
Given the difficulties with all three classes of interval estimation, especially when incorpo-
rating nuisance parameters, it is common in HEP to relax foundational rigor and:
• Treat nuisance parameters in a Bayesian way (marginalization) while treating the pa-
rameter of interest in a frequentist way. Virgil Highland and I were early advocates
of this for the luminosity uncertainty in upper limit calculation [85]. At PhyStat 2005
at Oxford, Kyle Cranmer revealed problems when used for background mean in a
5σ discovery context [86]. For a review of the background case and connection to
George Box’s semi-Bayesian “prior predictive p-value”, see Cousins, Linnemann, and
Tucker [50].
• Or, treat nuisance parameters by profile likelihood while treating parameter of interest
another way,
• Or, use the Bayesian framework (even without the priors recommended by statisti-
cians), but evaluate the frequentist performance [25]. In effect (as in profile likelihood)
one gets approximate coverage while respecting the L.P. In fact, the statistics litera-
ture has attempts to find prior pdfs that lead to posterior pdfs with good frequentist
coverage: probability matching priors. At lowest order in 1D, the matching prior is the
Jeffreys prior! [87].
12.8 A couple looks at the literature on nuisance parameters
In the mid-2000s, Luc Demortier and I both looked in the statistics literature regarding
nuisance parameters. I thought that my note was fairly thorough until I read his! Our
writeups:
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• R.D. Cousins, “Treatment of Nuisance Parameters in High Energy Physics, and Pos-
sible Justifications and Improvements in the Statistics Literature,” presented at the
PhyStat 2005 at Oxford [88] with response by statistician Nancy Reid [89].
• Luc Demortier, “P Values: What They Are and How to Use Them,” [90]. See also
Luc’s scholarly Chapter 4 on interval estimation in Ref. [42].
12.9 HEP “State of the art” for dealing with nuisance parameters
All three main classes of methods are commonly used on the parameter of interest. In
addition:
• Both marginalization and profiling are commonly used to treat nuisance parameters.
• Many people have the good practice of checking coverage.
• Too little attention is given to priors, in my opinion. But the flat prior for Poisson
mean is “safe” (from frequentist point of view) for upper limits (only!).
A serious analysis using any of the main methods requires coding up the model p(x|µ).
(It is needed at x = x0 to obtain the likelihood function, and at other x as well for confidence
intervals.) Doing this (once!) with the RooFit [91] modeling language gives access to RooSt-
ats [92] techniques for all three classes of calculations, and one can mix/match nuisance
parameter treatments.
13 Evaluation of coverage with toy MC simulation
For a single parameter of interest µ, one typically reports the confidence interval [µ1, µ2]
at some C.L. after elimination of nuisance parameters by some approximate method and
construction of intervals perhaps involving more approximations. It is important to check
that the approximations in the whole procedure have not materially altered the claimed
coverage, defined in Eqn. 23. Typically the performance is evaluated with a simplified MC
simulation, referred to as “toy Monte Carlo simulation”. First I describe the most thorough
evaluation (very CPU intensive), and then some approximations.
In frequentist statistics, the true values of all parameters are typically fixed but unknown.
A complete, rigorous check of coverage considers a fine multi-D grid of all parameters, and
for each multi-D point in the grid, generates an ensemble of toy MC pseudo-experiments,
runs the full analysis procedure, and finds the fraction of intervals covering the µt of interest
that was used for that ensemble. I.e., one calculates P (µt ∈ [µ1, µ2]), and compares to C.L.
Thus a thorough check of frequentist coverage includes:
1. Fix all parameters (of interest and nuisance) to a single set of true values. For this set,
(a) Loop over “pseudo-experiments”
(b) For each pseudo-experiment, loop over events, generating each event with toy
data generated from the statistical model with parameters set equal to the fixed
set.
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(c) Perform the same analysis on the toy events in the pseudo-experiment as was
done for the real data.
(d) Find that fraction of the pseudo-experiments for which parameter(s) of interest
are included in stated confidence intervals or regions.
2. Repeat for various other fixed sets of all parameters, ideally a fine grid.
But. . . the ideal of a fine grid is usually impractical. So the issue is what selection of “var-
ious other fixed sets” is adequate. Obviously one should check coverage for the set of true
values set equal to the global best-fit values. Just as obviously, this may not be adequate.
Some exploration is needed, particularly in directions where the uncertainty on a parameter
depends strongly on the parameter value. One can start by varying a few critical parameters
by one or two standard deviations, trying parameters near boundary/ies, and seeing how
stable coverage is.
A Bayesian-inspired approach is to calculate a weighted average of coverage over a neigh-
borhood of parameter sets for the nuisance parameters. This requires a choice of multi-D
prior. Instead of fixing the true values of nuisance parameters during the toy MC simulation,
one samples the true parameters from the posterior pdf of the nuisance parameters.
Numerous studies have been done for elimination of nuisance parameters in the test
statistic (typically a likelihood ratio), many concluding that results are relatively insensitive
to profiling vs marginalization, so that choice can be made based on CPU time. See for
example John Conway’s talk and writeup at PhyStat-2011 [93]. It seems that the method
for treating nuisance parameters in the toy MC generation of events may be more important
than the treatment choice in test statistic: with poor treatment in the test statistic, one may
lose statistical power but still calculate coverage correctly, while poor treatment in the toy
MC generation may lead to incorrect coverage calculation.
14 Downward fluctuations in searches for excesses
As mentioned in Section 6.6 and discussed in more detail in Section 6.9, a key problem that
has been a driver of the development of special methods for upper limits in HEP is the situa-
tion where there is Gaussian measurement resolution near a physical boundary. Specifically,
in the Gaussian model p(x|µ, σ) in Eqn. 10, µ may be a quantity that is physically non-
negative, e.g., a mass, a mass-squared, or an interaction cross section. Recall (Section 6.9)
that in this case negative values of the parameter µ do not exist in the model, but that
negative values of the observation x do exist in the sample space.
The traditional Neyman construction of frequentist one-sided 95% C.L. upper limits, for
α = 1−C.L. = 5%, is shown in Fig. 23. As the observation x0 becomes increasingly negative,
the standard frequentist upper limit (obtained by drawing a vertical line at observed x0)
becomes small, and then for x0 < −1.64σ, the upper limit is the null set!
Some people prefer to extend the construction to negative µ, which is a bad idea in my
opinion, since the model does not exist there (!); this leads to a different description of the
issue, so-called “unphysical” upper limits.
In any case, one should report enough information so that the consumer can make
interval estimates by any desired method. This would include the observed x (not constrained
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Figure 23: The traditional frequentist construction for one-sided upper limits at 95% C.L.,
for a Gaussian measurement with unit rms. A vertical line drawn through observed x0,
for x0 < −1.64σ, intersects no acceptance intervals, resulting in an empty-set confidence
interval.
to positive values) and the model p(x|µ). Such information is also essential for combining
results of different experiments.
This was an acute issue 20–30 years ago in experiments to measure the ν¯e mass (actually
the mass-squared) in tritium β decay: several observed x0 < 0. (With neutrino mixing, ν¯e is
presumably not a mass eigenstate, but one still speaks loosely of its mass, which is actually
an expectation value.) At the time (and still today, unfortunately), x0 was referred to as
the “measured value”, or point estimate mˆ2ν . The resulting confusion and resolutions make
a very long story; see my “virtual talk”, “Bayes, Fisher, Neyman, Neutrino Masses, and the
LHC” [51] and arXiv post [52]. (These also contain an introduction to “Buehler’s betting
game”, related to conditioning.)
The confidence intervals proposed by F-C and described in Section 6.9 are just one of
the three proposed ways to deal with this issue that have been widely adopted. The other
two are Bayesian with uniform prior (for the quantity with Gaussian resolution), and the
CLs criterion of the next subsection.
14.1 CLs
The unfortunately named CLs is the traditional frequentist one-tailed p-value for upper
limits divided by another tail probability (associated with the alternative hypothesis), i.e.,
by a number less than 1. The limits are thus (intentionally) conservative. A brief definition in
good notation is in the PDG RPP [13] (Eqn. 39.78, Section 39.4.2.4). CLs is a generalization
of an earlier result by Gu¨nter Zech [94] that considered the case of Poisson distribution with
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background and applied a non-standard form of conditioning on an inequality. The rationale
is further described by Alex Read in the early papers [95, 96]; an implementation with further
commentary is described by Tom Junk [97].
What is new (non-standard statistics) in CLs is combining two p-values into one quan-
tity. (This is referred to as a “modification” to the usual frequentist p-value.) The com-
bination (equivalent to a non-standard form of conditioning) is designed to avoid rejecting
H0 when the data are similarly incompatible with H1. This situation can arise when an
experiment has little sensitivity for distinguishing H0 from H1.
There is no established foundation in the statistics literature for this as far as I know. In
fact, the two uncombined p-values are considered to be the (irreducible) post-data “evidence”
for simple-vs-simple hypothesis testing in a philosophical monograph by Bill Thompson [98]
(p. 108). Clearly, with both p-values at hand, as with the Higgs spin-parity example in Sec-
tion 7.6.2, the consumer has the complete information regarding post-data tail probabilities.
(Ofer Vitells has unearthed a suggestion in a 1961 paper by Birnbaum [99] (p. 434)
that combines the pre-data Type I and Type II errors rates α and β into one quantity in
the identical manner, i.e., α/(1 − β); Birnbaum’s motivation was that this quantity equals
the likelihood ratio in a very special case where the test statistic is the single binary digit
“reject H0” or “do not reject H0” (rather than the full likelihood ratio). But this seems to
be obscure to modern statisticians, and Birnbaum’s last paper [100] examined both α and
1 − β (the usual “power”), not just the combination α/(1 − β), in defining his “confidence
concept”.)
In any case, the CLs quantity does have properties that many find to be attractive. In
particular, for the two simple prototype problems (Poisson with known mean background,
and the bounded Gaussian problem), the results are numerically identical to the Bayesian
answers with uniform prior, and hence the likelihood principle is respected. These Bayesian
interval estimates over-cover from a frequentist point, which is not considered to be as bad
as under-coverage. (Regarding the uniform priors, for both these models negative µ does
not exist in the model, so it is incorrect to speak of the prior being zero for negative µ, as
in Section 6.9)
The step of combining the two p-values into one quantity is called “the CLs criterion”
in (most) CMS papers. Unfortunately, the calculation of the p-values themselves, typically
using a likelihood-ratio test statistic, is sometimes called the “CLs method” in HEP. But
these p-values themselves have long existed in the statistics literature and should be desig-
nated that way (and not denoted with equally unfortunate names that the original papers
of CLs use for them).
The many issues of p-values are of course inherited by CLs, namely:
• What specific likelihood ratio is used in the test statistic;
• How nuisance parameters are treated (marginalization, profiling);
• What ensembles are used for “toy MC” simulation used to get the distribution of the
test statistic under H0 (e.g. no Higgs) and H1 (e.g. SM with Higgs).
LEP, Tevatron, and LHC Higgs experimenters differed in the choices made (!).
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15 ATLAS and CMS Conventions
For many years, ATLAS and CMS physicists have collaborated on statistics tools (the RooSt-
ats [92] software), and attempted to have some coherence in methods, so that results could
be compared, and (when worth the effort) combined.
A key development was the paper by Cowan, Cranmer, Gross and Vitells (CCGV) [67]
that extends asymptotic formulas to various cases where Wilks’s theorem is not valid.
As the CCGV asymptotic formulas correspond to the “fully frequentist” treatment of
nuisance parameters, for consistency we tended to use that treatment in many cases at small
N as well. Toy MC simulation is thus performed in an approximate frequentist manner
in which the underlying parametric distribution of the data is known up to one or more
parameters, and sampling is performed from that distribution after substituting estimates
for the parameter(s). (This is known as the parametric bootstrap [101].)
For upper limits, there was a lot of discussion among CMS and ATLAS physicists in
the early LHC days without convergence, with the result that the two experiments’ physics
coordinators in 2010 decreed that CLs (Section 14.1) be used in most cases.
The ATLAS/CMS Higgs boson results followed these trends. A jointly written descrip-
tion is, “Procedure for the LHC Higgs boson search combination in Summer 2011” [102].
Many issues were further discussed and described in the ATLAS-CMS combination
papers for mass [103] and couplings [104]. In particular, a lot of attention was paid to cor-
relations. In the last couple years, Feldman-Cousins [53] starts to be used in some analyses,
without my pushing. (Initially some at the LHC were very opposed, evidently because it
could return a two-sided interval not including zero when they insisted on a strict upper
limit.)
16 My advocacy for >10 years
Have in place tools to allow computation of results using a variety of recipes, for problems
up to intermediate complexity:
• Bayesian with analysis of sensitivity to prior
• Profile likelihood ratio (MINUIT MINOS)
• Frequentist construction with approximate treatment of nuisance parameters
• Other “favorites” such as CLs (an HEP invention).
The community can (and should) then demand that a result shown with one’s preferred
method also be shown with the other methods, and sampling properties studied.
When the methods all agree, we are in asymptotic Nirvana (idyllic state). When meth-
ods disagree, we are reminded that the results are answers to different questions, and we
learn something! E.g.:
• Bayesian methods can have poor frequentist properties
• Frequentist methods can badly violate Likelihood Principle.
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In fact, the community reached the point of having the tools in place (RooStats [92])
by the time of the Higgs boson discovery, and they have continued to be improved. What is
not as far along is the “demands” of the community, in my opinion. I would prefer that it
be more common for papers to compare explicitly the chosen method with other methods,
as is sometimes done.
17 Unsound statements you can now avoid
• “It makes no sense to talk about the probability density of a constant of nature.”
• “Frequentist confidence intervals for efficiency measurements don’t work when all trials
give successes.”
• “We used a uniform prior because this introduces the least bias.”
• “We used a uniform positive prior as a function of the parameter of interest.”
• “A noninformative prior probability density does not contain any information.”
• “The total number of events could fluctuate in our experiment, so obviously our toy
Monte Carlo simulation should let the number of events fluctuate.”
• “We used Delta-likelihood contours so there was no Gaussian approximation.”
• “A five-sigma departure from the SM constitutes a discovery.”
• “The confidence level tells you how much confidence one has that the true value is in
the confidence interval.”
• “We used the tail area under the likelihood function to measure the significance.”
• “Statistics is obvious, so I prefer not to read the literature and just figure it out for
myself!”
A Details of spin discrimination example of simple-vs-
simple hypothesis test
Ref. [105] describes an enlightening toy example with simple hypotheses. The setup is the
observation of a new resonance with a mass of 1.5 TeV in the dilepton final state at the LHC
(unfortunately optimistic thus far). We consider here the case of just two simple hypotheses
for the spin of the new resonance, either a spin-1 vector boson or a spin-2 graviton. In order
to avoid confusion between subscripts and spin values, the hypotheses are called HA and HB.
The distinguishing observable is the so-called Collins-Soper angle θ∗CS, which is a useful
approximation to the angle in the CM frame between the incoming quark and the outgoing
µ−. Figure 24 shows the simulated distributions of cos θ∗CS for the two spin hypotheses. The
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Figure 24: Histograms of cos θ∗CS of individual events from the generated (dashed) and ac-
cepted (solid) samples of spin-1 Z′ (left) and spin-2 G∗ (right) for 1.5 TeV mass. From
Ref. [105].
events in the detector’s geometrical acceptance (solid histograms) are used in the analysis.
The histograms numerically define the models p(cos θ∗CS|HA) and p(cos θ∗CS|HB).
As dictated by the Neyman–Pearson lemma (Section 7.2.1), the optimal test statistic
for distinguishing the two hypotheses is the likelihood ratio
λ = L(HA)/L(HB), (34)
from which one usually considers the monotonic function −2 lnλ. For a data set with N
events indexed by i, λ is the product of event likelihood ratios, so that −2 lnλ is the sum of
the individual event quantities,
−2 lnλ =
N∑
i
−2 ln
(
p(cos θ∗CS,i|HA)
p(cos θ∗CS,i|HB)
)
. (35)
Figure 25(left) and right are histograms of the individual terms in the sum, with events
on the left simulated according to HA as in Figure 24(left), and events on the right simulated
according to HB, as in Figure 24(right).
We then consider data sets (“experiments”) that each contain a sample of N events
from the distributions in Figure 25, with the values summed as in Eqn. 35. Figure 26 shows
on the left the distribution for 10,000 simulated experiments, each with N = 50, and on the
right for N = 200. We see the dramatic effect of the central limit theorem, which says that
each histogram of sums tends to Gaussian in spite of the highly non-Gaussian distribution
of the addends from Fig. 25; and that furthermore the mean and rms of each are correctly
related to those in Fig. 25.
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Figure 25: Histograms of −2 lnλ = 2 lnL(HA) − 2 lnL(HB) for individual events from the
accepted samples generated according to HA (spin-1) and HB (spin-2) for a 1.5 TeV resonance.
From Ref. [105].
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Figure 26: Histograms of −2 lnλ for simulated experiments with 1.5 TeV dilepton mass, each
of which is a sum of N values of −2 lnλ from spin-1 and spin-2 events in Fig. 25, for N = 50
(left) and N = 200 (right) events per experiment. The superimposed Gaussian curves have
means fixed at a factor of N greater than that of the events in Fig. 25, and rms deviations
a factor of
√
N greater. From Ref. [105].
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Figure 27: On the left are plots of α and β as a function of the cut −2 lnλcut,α that is applied
to the histograms in Fig. 26(left). On the right is a plot of β vs α derived from the curves
on the left.
Recalling the prescriptions in Sections 7 and 7.2.1, to perform a N-P hypothesis test of
HA, one finds the cutoff λcut,α for the desired Type I error probability α and rejects HA if
λ ≤ λcut,α. The Type II error probability β then follows. Both of these error probabilities
are easily obtained from the histograms in Fig. 26 and plotted as a function of −2 lnλcut,α,
in Fig.27(left), for N = 50. One can also plot β vs α as in Fig. 27(right) for N = 50. As
noted in Section 7.1, the choice of operating point on the β vs α curve (or equivalent ROC
curve) requires multiple considerations.
B Look-elsewhere effect
In these lectures, I did not have time for the important (and increasingly mandatory) calcula-
tion of the LEE. A starting point for self-study is the discussion by Louis Lyons, “Comments
on ‘Look Elsewhere Effect’ ” [106]. See also Section 9.2 of my paper on the Jeffreys-Lindley
Paradox [3].
An important paper for practical calculations, and also for qualitative insight, is by
Eilam Gross and Ofer Vitells, “Trial factors for the look elsewhere effect in high energy
physics,” [107].
C Bayesian hypothesis testing (model selection)
As mentioned very briefly in Sections 5, 5.11, and 10, the duality used in frequentist hypothe-
sis testing (Section 7.4) is not used in Bayesian statistics. The usual methods follow Chapter
5 of Harold Jeffreys’s book [16]: Bayes’s Theorem is applied to the models themselves after
integrating out all parameters, including the parameter of interest! This is typically pre-
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sented by Bayesian advocates as “logical” and therefore simple to use, with great benefits
such as automatic “Occam’s razor” penalizing less predictive models, etc.
In fact, Bayesian model selection is full of subtleties, and even for the experts, it can
be a “can of worms” (James Berger [32], Rejoinder, p. 459). As just one indication, Jeffreys
and followers use different priors for integrating out parameter(s) in model selection than for
the same parameter(s) in parameter estimation. Here I mainly just say: Beware! There are
posted/published applications in HEP that are silly (by Bayesian standards). As mentioned
in Section 5.11, a pseudo-Bayes example in PRL provoked me to write a Comment [41] that
has some references to useful Bayesian literature.
The dependence on prior probabilities for the models themselves can be factored out,
leading to a “Bayes factor” that is the ratio of posterior odds to prior odds. However, the
Bayes factor still depends on prior pdfs for parameters in the models, and this leads to direct
sensitivity to the prior pdf for a parameter that is in one model but not in the other. For
testing H0:µ = µ0 vs H1:µ 6= µ0, improper priors for µ that work fine for estimation become
a disaster. Adding a cut-off to make them proper just gives (typically arbitrary) cutoff
dependence.
In the asymptotic limit of lots of data, your answers in a test of a point null vs a
continuous alternative (either the probability H0 is true, or also the Bayes factor) remain
directly proportional to the prior pdf for the parameter of interest. This is totally different
behavior compared to Bayesian interval estimation, where the effect of a prior typically
becomes negligible as the likelihood function becomes narrowly peaked at large N .
For a review and comparison to p-values in the discovery of Higgs boson, see my paper,
“The Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox and Discovery Criteria in High Energy Physics” [3]. As
mentioned in Section 5.11, see also Chapter 12 by Harrison Prosper in Ref. [42].
D Point estimation
Most of this paper is about intervals; I have do not say much about what to quote as the
“measured value” (typically using the MLE by default). Statisticians call this the “point
estimate”. There is a huge literature on point estimation; see e.g. Chapters 7 and 8 in
Ref. [2].
If you are well-grounded in interval estimation, one approach is to use that machinery
to get a point estimate. E.g., one might take the mid-point of (say) your 68% C.L. central
interval. But a better approach is probably to let the C.L. go to 0, so that your interval gets
shorter and shorter, and use the limiting point. For both the LR ordering for confidence
intervals (F-C), and for likelihood ratio intervals, this results in the maximum likelihood
estimate.
To give an idea of how rich the subject is, I show a few interesting things from Ref. [2].
D.0.1 Point estimation: Traditional desiderata
• Consistency: Estimate converges toward true value as number of observations N in-
creases
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• Unbiasedness: Expectation value of estimate is equal to the true value. (Bias and
consistency are independent properties; see Fig. 7.2 in Ref. [2].)
• Efficiency: Estimate has minimum variance
• Minimum loss of information: (technical definition)
• Robustness: Insensitivity to departures from the assumed distribution
One can add:
• Simplicity: transparent and understandable
• Minimum computer time: still relevant in online applications, less relevant otherwise
• Minimum loss of physicist’s time (how much weight to put on this?)
These desired properties can be impossible to achieve simultaneously. How to choose?
A thorough analysis requires further input: what are the costs of not incorporating various
desiderata? Then formal decision theory can be used to choose estimator.
In practice in HEP, maximum likelihood estimates are often used (even though they are
typically not unbiased). Typically the MLE is consistent and has other excellent asymptotic
properties (e.g., estimate is asymptotically normal). For finite N , the MLE works well in
the so-called exponential family that includes binomial, Poisson, and Gaussian. As noted
in Section 4.2, the MLE is invariant under reparameterization. (This means that if it is
unbiased in one metric, it is typically biased in other metrics, as discussed in Ref. [11],
Section 5.3.1.)
D.0.2 Alternatives to the arithmetic mean when model is non-Gaussian
Fred James [2] (pp. 209 ff) has a very illuminating discussion of the MLEs for a diverse set
of pdfs, representing long tails, short tails, and in between. If p(x|µ) = f(x− µ), where f is
some pdf, then µ is called a location parameter. Some common examples of pdfs were µ is a
location parameter are:
Normal: p ∼ exp(−(x− µ)2/2σ2)
Uniform: p = constant for |x− µ| < a; p = 0 otherwise
Cauchy: p ∼ 1/(a2 + (x− µ)2)
Double exponential: p ∼ exp(−a|x− µ|)
These examples are all symmetric about µ: p(µ+ y) = p(µ− y)
Suppose you are given N=11 values of x randomly sampled from p(x|µ). What estimator
(function of the 11 values) gives you the “best” estimate of µ ? If by “best” you mean
minimum variance, it is the M.L. estimate, resulting in a different formula for each of the
above cases! Three of the four are special cases of Lp, the estimator that minimizes the sum
over the observations of |xi−µ|p. Different values of p put different emphasis on observations
in the tails.
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Only for the normal pdf is the MLE equal to the arithmetic mean, obtained by the
familiar least-squares technique (p = 2). Can you guess what the MLE is for the uniform
and the exponential cases? (For the Cauchy pdf, with its long tails, the arithmetic mean is
particularly useless; see also discussion by Efron [8]).
If the true distribution departs from that assumed, then the estimate of location is no
longer optimal. Sensitivity is in the tails! See the nice discussion of asymptotic variance and
robustness in Ref. [2] (pp. 211 ff).
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